I've been very specific in what I was saying - and I have been clear on the definition of stability. That said I accept your comment and would happily be corre

I've been very specific in what I was saying - and I have been clear on the definition of stability. That said I accept your comment and would happily be corrected, but everything I have seen has stated that there is no inherent instability in the design of the 737 Max. What I have seen (and is widely reported) is that low speed high AoA may have increased the possibility of stall compared to how previous gen 737's behaved, but we're again not talking about stability as I've been clear to define it. That increase in the possibility of stall appears to be the reason why MCAS became more powerful and operated at these critical phases of flight. It would obviously make no sense for Boeing to design an aircraft that was unbalanced. That would increase drag and reduce fuel efficiency. It's also understandable that the large and more powerful engines, plus their slightly further forward positioning, would create a slightly higher nose up pitch when compared to the previous 737's under certain phases of flight/flight configurations. That's not to say it made the aircraft unstable or unflyable, but it would suggest a reason why MCAS might be shoved into action there, in another attempt to recreate the same handling characteristics as the previous generations. That seems far more likely to be where the greater authority for MCAS came from (it would need greater authority under that flight configuration/phase of flight). It's also far more likely that there was a simple screw-up and MCAS was given too much authority and too little breadth of input. Every bit of evidence so far suggests a fight for compromise over retaining type certification and use of MCAS. Nothing suggests inherent instability.