19 ms·

Blaming the user is a pernicious problem in UX engineering, especially when a feature is introduced not for the actual users, but the executives making the purc

by rswail 7y ago

Blaming the user is a pernicious problem in UX engineering, especially when a feature is introduced not for the actual users, but the executives making the purchasing decisions. MCAS was an economics driven decision by Boeing to be able to sell it as a "no cost" upgrade to existing 737 fleets. "You get all this and you don't need to retrain your people" The entire concept of the 737 MAX was flawed, marketing an inherently unstable aircraft with a patched undocumented system to control that instability. Then, incredibly, making the safety indicators an optional extra was criminal. The FAA is also liable for regulatory capture and handing over its responsibilities the actual organization it is supposed to be supervising. Ultimately, it's an example of what happens when MBA execs, convinced that they can run "any business" take over from a rigourous engineering culture. The Harvard (and other) Business Schools have a lot to be blamed for.

rosege 7y ago
If you haven't seen it you should check out John Oliver's bit on Harvard's MBA ethics pledge from when he was on The Daily Show. Here's a link that isnt region locked - http://dailybail.com/home/the-daily-show-enlists-a-prison-coach-to-encourage-harvard-m.html http://dailybail.com/home/the-daily-show-enlists-a-prison-co...
PuffinBlue 7y ago
> marketing an inherently unstable aircraft The 737 Max is not an inherently unstable aircraft and to say so grossly misunderstands the term and what MCAS was doing. MCAS existed to make an inherently stable aircraft handle in the same was as previous 737 generations. Design changes had forced the addition of this system in order to retain the same type rating because those design changes caused the aircraft to handle differently to previous generations. MCAS was about keeping the same type rating and the same handling characteristics. It had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with 'inherent instability' - the 737 Max is an inherently stable aircraft without MCAS. Continuing to spread misinformation about what MCAS is and the 737 Max stability is detrimental to the discussion. EDIT - There is clearly a lot of misunderstand about the terms 'stable' and 'unstable'. These has a defined meaning in aircraft handling. I encourage you to educate yourselves on the term, on what stability actually is in relation to this discussion. https://www.boldmethod.com/learn-to-fly/aerodynamics/3-types-of-static-and-dynamic-stability-in-aircraft/ https://www.boldmethod.com/learn-to-fly/aerodynamics/3-types... The 737 Max is a stable aircraft. The 737 Max without MCAS activated is a stable aircraft. It is an inherently stable design. The 737 Max can and was flown without MCAS activated (even by the same aircraft as crashed, the pilots of the previous flight pulled the stabiliser cut out switches and went to manual trim control). It is a stable aircraft.
- acqq 7y ago
  > Design changes had forced the addition of this system in order to retain the same type rating because those design changes caused the aircraft to handle differently to previous generations. It's not "just to retain the same type rating" that the MCAS worked as it worked. The MCAS, as it was implemented in the planes which crashed had to be implemented for the plane to pass the certification requirements which exist because of the safety. The plane is with its geometry inherently unsafe without some clever devices correcting the "inherent" behavior. Anybody who claims it's not "unstable" does misdirection of clinging to the technicalities of wording of the specific claim (as the plane can be technically-speaking "stable", if nothing unexpected happens, while still being the death trap under non-average conditions, and that's what happened here), as there are more elephants in the room remaining, to be specific: - The regulation exists to provide safety. - Boeing 737 MAX is unsafe to fly without some additional hardware and software which does the compensation. Nobody can sell or certify the Boeing 737 MAX as it is designed without adding some hardware and software that would do something similar to MCAS. "Just turning off MCAS" permanently or "just removing it" makes the plane non certifiable safety-wise, not only losing its "type rating." - MCAS design (its power) wasn't decided only once and implemented. The set of events was that only during the test flights the additional problems with the safety of the plane's response to the commands were detected, and the MCAS revisions added more power to MCAS (and less to the pilots) through the time. The result was that the MCAS which exists on all the planes sold (and the planes crashed) is not the MCAS from the initial specifications or claimed by Boeing after the crashes, as they still quoted the original characteristics. - The goal of Boeing of "keeping the same type rating" is the motivation why they decided to lie about what they implemented and why they actively reduced the safety of the plane to the point of plane actively being the death trap. - Specifically, Boeing misused the trust it had: through the years Boeing was allowed to do more and more of the certification work for their own planes. - Not to mention disastrous public claims there's nothing wrong with their planes even after the two crashes, a lot of information already public and most of the world already having grounded the planes. - Not only Boeing lied about what they did to the FAA and the rest of the world, even after the first crash happened, but while making the plane the engineering decisions have been made more than once just with the goal of preserving the false promises made by the Boeing managers as they have sold the planes: that's why there was the change in the behavior of the switches where there were separate switches before but they changed two switches to behave identically, only to actively hide what the new MCAS was doing. That's why the system was made glaringly non-redundant: adding redundancy would make it obvious that the system was (and it actually was) critical. In short, it's not misinformation that 737 MAX was a death trap made as such under the guidance of Boeing's managers. There are many levels of evilness Boeing managed to achieve in designing the plane and responding to the existing crashes. Some managers should be prosecuted for what they did. If that doesn't happen, the laws should be changed to allow that kind of responsibility the next time, or there will be even more victims.
eru 7y ago
I'm not sure why you get so worked up? From what I can tell flying is far too safe for its own good. Seriously: Flying is regulated to ridiculous level of safety. At current levels, each marginal dollar spent on flight safety would do much better being spent on driving safety or more radically, preventing deaths from malaria. If we apply unequal dollar amounts to how much we are willing to pay for each life saved in different areas of life, we are saving fewer lives than we could.
- marakv2 7y ago
  That's an I tereting point of view, and I don't want to dismiss it out of hand. Do you have any links re:that subject?
  - eru 7y ago
    Which part? I tried to find some numbers about how much the marginal life saved in aviation costs vs other areas. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_of_life https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_of_life is a good start, but doesn't have the numbers I was looking for. The argument about paying two different prices for the same good buying you less than settling on a uniform price is basic economics. But it seems like something the LessWrong people or SlateStarCodex might have a write-up for. The topic is difficult to discuss because huam life is a 'sacred good' and money is a 'profane good', and it is not socially acceptable to admit that we are making finite trade-offs between the two. And I do have some sympathy for safety regulations of the aircraft themselves, as they are mostly based on actual engineering, as opposed to the safety theater when you board the plane. But honestly, people aren't just trading off lives for money, they are trading off lives for minor inconveniences: you could make airplanes safer at no extra cost by mounting the seats backwards and removing the windows. Windows are the essentially holes, they weakest points on the airframe. Removing them from the design would even save money. Of course, you'd have a hard time finding enough passengers to pay to fly in you windowless plan. (The military doesn't have a problem with that. Their passengers don't have much of a choice.)
WalterBright 7y ago
All jetliners are unstable, which is why they have a yaw damper as required equipment since the 707. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yaw_damper https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yaw_damper
- jonsen 7y ago
  “Dutch roll stability can be artificially increased by the installation of a yaw damper.” Less stable is not the same as unstable.
  - WalterBright 7y ago
    There have been crashes as the result of the yaw damper being disconnected. That's why they're required equipment. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dutch_roll#Accidents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dutch_roll#Accidents
    - clucas 7y ago
      In software, "stable" often means that, given certain assumptions (OS interfaces, working hardware, etc), the code will not crash even if given bad inputs. Based on my reading of this thread, in aviation, "stable" means that, given certain assumptions (fuel supply, etc), the plane will tend to return to equilibrium after pretensions along one particular axis, if you give it no inputs. Pilots in the thread, please correct me if I'm wrong. You may think to yourself "that's stupid, stable means it doesn't crash!" But if you want to communicate with people in the field, you have to learn their language. If an astrophysicist said "what do you mean that program is stable?? It doesn't have enough hydrogen to roast a marshmallow, much less initiate and sustain fusion!" you would roll your eyes. Sure it's all the same English word, and there is even a common semantic root, but they all mean very different things in their contexts.
    - jonsen 7y ago
      Planes are stable by design. Instabilities have causes: >a rudder power control unit malfunction led to a Dutch roll oscillatory instability >a Dutch roll incident following structural failure of the rudder >a trainee pilot's actions violently exacerbated the Dutch roll motion and caused three of the four engines to be torn from the wings
crispyambulance 7y ago
> ... it's an example of what happens when MBA execs, convinced that they can run "any business" take over from a rigourous engineering culture. The Harvard (and other) Business Schools have a lot to be blamed for. Sadly, the culture problems brought by bean-counters are the very last thing that will see the light of day. They're really the "long story" root cause problem here. It's the same kind of mentality that lead to the Challenger disaster, new building collapses in China and countless other less dramatic failures of big projects and systems. Don't hold your breath for anyone to held accountable, don't expect that business will learn a lesson from this.
- pilsner 7y ago
  This article covers the culture problem exhaustively https://www.perell.com/blog/boeing-737-max https://www.perell.com/blog/boeing-737-max
panarky 7y ago
> such a pernicious and deadly design Yes, MCAS is a pernicious and deadly design. Equally, Boeing's corporate governance and FAA's regulation and oversight are also "pernicious and deadly". All must be fixed before this aircraft flies again.
- chopin 7y ago
  You can't fix a culture developed over 20 years (at least not fast). Especially if its a culture seen as good and beneficial by everything that surrounds you. Let's face it: the culture problems at Boeing are only a sign of the same problem everywhere. If fixing culture is a prerequisite the MAX will never fly again.
anonu 7y ago
> The Harvard (and other) Business Schools have a lot to be blamed for Is this documented? Did MBAs from HBS flood the FAA? And how would that lead to a plane falling out of the sky? I'm with you on the general gist of your comment with regards to HBS - but I'd be careful about starting a witch hunt.
ericmay 7y ago
This went unnoticed but, do we know whether the executives or those who made the decisions here were all MBA graduates? I am an MBA student and we do case studies on exactly these kinds of issues and how the correct course of action, but ethically and financially is to do the right thing. Maybe others disagree but this comment definitely stood out to me.
situational87 7y ago
I'm not sure why we're even having this discussion, even a non-technical layperson reading a description of how MCAS was supposed to work can immediately realize it's a horribly flawed and unsafe design. You don't need any experience with aviation or engineering, that's how awful the design is.
statusquoantefa 7y ago
> Blaming the user is a pernicious problem in UX engineering I've been around computers since well before it was called UX, and since UX? trust me, I never blame users, I definitely blame UX. we need to bring back UI.

by rswail 7y ago

rosege 7y ago

If you haven't seen it you should check out John Oliver's bit on Harvard's MBA ethics pledge from when he was on The Daily Show. Here's a link that isnt region locked - http://dailybail.com/home/the-daily-show-enlists-a-prison-coach-to-encourage-harvard-m.html http://dailybail.com/home/the-daily-show-enlists-a-prison-co...

PuffinBlue 7y ago

> marketing an inherently unstable aircraft The 737 Max is not an inherently unstable aircraft and to say so grossly misunderstands the term and what MCAS was doing. MCAS existed to make an inherently stable aircraft handle in the same was as previous 737 generations. Design changes had forced the addition of this system in order to retain the same type rating because those design changes caused the aircraft to handle differently to previous generations. MCAS was about keeping the same type rating and the same handling characteristics. It had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with 'inherent instability' - the 737 Max is an inherently stable aircraft without MCAS. Continuing to spread misinformation about what MCAS is and the 737 Max stability is detrimental to the discussion. EDIT - There is clearly a lot of misunderstand about the terms 'stable' and 'unstable'. These has a defined meaning in aircraft handling. I encourage you to educate yourselves on the term, on what stability actually is in relation to this discussion. https://www.boldmethod.com/learn-to-fly/aerodynamics/3-types-of-static-and-dynamic-stability-in-aircraft/ https://www.boldmethod.com/learn-to-fly/aerodynamics/3-types... The 737 Max is a stable aircraft. The 737 Max without MCAS activated is a stable aircraft. It is an inherently stable design. The 737 Max can and was flown without MCAS activated (even by the same aircraft as crashed, the pilots of the previous flight pulled the stabiliser cut out switches and went to manual trim control). It is a stable aircraft.

acqq 7y ago
> Design changes had forced the addition of this system in order to retain the same type rating because those design changes caused the aircraft to handle differently to previous generations. It's not "just to retain the same type rating" that the MCAS worked as it worked. The MCAS, as it was implemented in the planes which crashed had to be implemented for the plane to pass the certification requirements which exist because of the safety. The plane is with its geometry inherently unsafe without some clever devices correcting the "inherent" behavior. Anybody who claims it's not "unstable" does misdirection of clinging to the technicalities of wording of the specific claim (as the plane can be technically-speaking "stable", if nothing unexpected happens, while still being the death trap under non-average conditions, and that's what happened here), as there are more elephants in the room remaining, to be specific: - The regulation exists to provide safety. - Boeing 737 MAX is unsafe to fly without some additional hardware and software which does the compensation. Nobody can sell or certify the Boeing 737 MAX as it is designed without adding some hardware and software that would do something similar to MCAS. "Just turning off MCAS" permanently or "just removing it" makes the plane non certifiable safety-wise, not only losing its "type rating." - MCAS design (its power) wasn't decided only once and implemented. The set of events was that only during the test flights the additional problems with the safety of the plane's response to the commands were detected, and the MCAS revisions added more power to MCAS (and less to the pilots) through the time. The result was that the MCAS which exists on all the planes sold (and the planes crashed) is not the MCAS from the initial specifications or claimed by Boeing after the crashes, as they still quoted the original characteristics. - The goal of Boeing of "keeping the same type rating" is the motivation why they decided to lie about what they implemented and why they actively reduced the safety of the plane to the point of plane actively being the death trap. - Specifically, Boeing misused the trust it had: through the years Boeing was allowed to do more and more of the certification work for their own planes. - Not to mention disastrous public claims there's nothing wrong with their planes even after the two crashes, a lot of information already public and most of the world already having grounded the planes. - Not only Boeing lied about what they did to the FAA and the rest of the world, even after the first crash happened, but while making the plane the engineering decisions have been made more than once just with the goal of preserving the false promises made by the Boeing managers as they have sold the planes: that's why there was the change in the behavior of the switches where there were separate switches before but they changed two switches to behave identically, only to actively hide what the new MCAS was doing. That's why the system was made glaringly non-redundant: adding redundancy would make it obvious that the system was (and it actually was) critical. In short, it's not misinformation that 737 MAX was a death trap made as such under the guidance of Boeing's managers. There are many levels of evilness Boeing managed to achieve in designing the plane and responding to the existing crashes. Some managers should be prosecuted for what they did. If that doesn't happen, the laws should be changed to allow that kind of responsibility the next time, or there will be even more victims.

eru 7y ago

I'm not sure why you get so worked up? From what I can tell flying is far too safe for its own good. Seriously: Flying is regulated to ridiculous level of safety. At current levels, each marginal dollar spent on flight safety would do much better being spent on driving safety or more radically, preventing deaths from malaria. If we apply unequal dollar amounts to how much we are willing to pay for each life saved in different areas of life, we are saving fewer lives than we could.

marakv2 7y ago
That's an I tereting point of view, and I don't want to dismiss it out of hand. Do you have any links re:that subject?
- eru 7y ago
  Which part? I tried to find some numbers about how much the marginal life saved in aviation costs vs other areas. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_of_life https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_of_life is a good start, but doesn't have the numbers I was looking for. The argument about paying two different prices for the same good buying you less than settling on a uniform price is basic economics. But it seems like something the LessWrong people or SlateStarCodex might have a write-up for. The topic is difficult to discuss because huam life is a 'sacred good' and money is a 'profane good', and it is not socially acceptable to admit that we are making finite trade-offs between the two. And I do have some sympathy for safety regulations of the aircraft themselves, as they are mostly based on actual engineering, as opposed to the safety theater when you board the plane. But honestly, people aren't just trading off lives for money, they are trading off lives for minor inconveniences: you could make airplanes safer at no extra cost by mounting the seats backwards and removing the windows. Windows are the essentially holes, they weakest points on the airframe. Removing them from the design would even save money. Of course, you'd have a hard time finding enough passengers to pay to fly in you windowless plan. (The military doesn't have a problem with that. Their passengers don't have much of a choice.)

WalterBright 7y ago

All jetliners are unstable, which is why they have a yaw damper as required equipment since the 707. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yaw_damper https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yaw_damper

jonsen 7y ago
“Dutch roll stability can be artificially increased by the installation of a yaw damper.” Less stable is not the same as unstable.
- WalterBright 7y ago
  There have been crashes as the result of the yaw damper being disconnected. That's why they're required equipment. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dutch_roll#Accidents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dutch_roll#Accidents
  - clucas 7y ago
    In software, "stable" often means that, given certain assumptions (OS interfaces, working hardware, etc), the code will not crash even if given bad inputs. Based on my reading of this thread, in aviation, "stable" means that, given certain assumptions (fuel supply, etc), the plane will tend to return to equilibrium after pretensions along one particular axis, if you give it no inputs. Pilots in the thread, please correct me if I'm wrong. You may think to yourself "that's stupid, stable means it doesn't crash!" But if you want to communicate with people in the field, you have to learn their language. If an astrophysicist said "what do you mean that program is stable?? It doesn't have enough hydrogen to roast a marshmallow, much less initiate and sustain fusion!" you would roll your eyes. Sure it's all the same English word, and there is even a common semantic root, but they all mean very different things in their contexts.
  - jonsen 7y ago
    Planes are stable by design. Instabilities have causes: >a rudder power control unit malfunction led to a Dutch roll oscillatory instability >a Dutch roll incident following structural failure of the rudder >a trainee pilot's actions violently exacerbated the Dutch roll motion and caused three of the four engines to be torn from the wings

crispyambulance 7y ago

> ... it's an example of what happens when MBA execs, convinced that they can run "any business" take over from a rigourous engineering culture. The Harvard (and other) Business Schools have a lot to be blamed for. Sadly, the culture problems brought by bean-counters are the very last thing that will see the light of day. They're really the "long story" root cause problem here. It's the same kind of mentality that lead to the Challenger disaster, new building collapses in China and countless other less dramatic failures of big projects and systems. Don't hold your breath for anyone to held accountable, don't expect that business will learn a lesson from this.

pilsner 7y ago
This article covers the culture problem exhaustively https://www.perell.com/blog/boeing-737-max https://www.perell.com/blog/boeing-737-max

panarky 7y ago

> such a pernicious and deadly design Yes, MCAS is a pernicious and deadly design. Equally, Boeing's corporate governance and FAA's regulation and oversight are also "pernicious and deadly". All must be fixed before this aircraft flies again.

chopin 7y ago
You can't fix a culture developed over 20 years (at least not fast). Especially if its a culture seen as good and beneficial by everything that surrounds you. Let's face it: the culture problems at Boeing are only a sign of the same problem everywhere. If fixing culture is a prerequisite the MAX will never fly again.

anonu 7y ago

> The Harvard (and other) Business Schools have a lot to be blamed for Is this documented? Did MBAs from HBS flood the FAA? And how would that lead to a plane falling out of the sky? I'm with you on the general gist of your comment with regards to HBS - but I'd be careful about starting a witch hunt.

ericmay 7y ago

This went unnoticed but, do we know whether the executives or those who made the decisions here were all MBA graduates? I am an MBA student and we do case studies on exactly these kinds of issues and how the correct course of action, but ethically and financially is to do the right thing. Maybe others disagree but this comment definitely stood out to me.

situational87 7y ago

I'm not sure why we're even having this discussion, even a non-technical layperson reading a description of how MCAS was supposed to work can immediately realize it's a horribly flawed and unsafe design. You don't need any experience with aviation or engineering, that's how awful the design is.

statusquoantefa 7y ago

> Blaming the user is a pernicious problem in UX engineering I've been around computers since well before it was called UX, and since UX? trust me, I never blame users, I definitely blame UX. we need to bring back UI.