I agree that there should be more emphasis on the mutability of scientific knowledge when things like this are presented, but I think your claims about the natu

I agree that there should be more emphasis on the mutability of scientific knowledge when things like this are presented, but I think your claims about the nature of scientific hypotheses have some problems: Suppose I form a scientific hypotheses P. By your claim it cannot be proven true, just disproven later on with new evidence. That is, P is not probable, but ~P is. Then, later, I form a second scientific hypotheses which happens to be the negation of the first: ~P. Again by your claim, ~P is unprovable but its negation, P can be proven. This is a contradiction, either P can be proven or it can't. I think you're actually talking about a scientific theory, which can not be proven true but which can--as evidence comes to light--be shown to be less useful than alternatives and therefore not fit for maintenance (which is not the same as being false). The trouble with climate science is a separate one. Causation can not be separated from correlation without experiment. Experiment requires both a control variable and an experimental variable--but we only have one Earth to dick around with, so there are no experiments available which will generate a definitive causal argument for cause regarding the global climate. Rather than arguing about whether there is cause (behavior that the Smithsonian rightly dislikes), I think that we should instead accept that the cause question is unknowable and focus instead on how we as a global culture intend to gamble on it. The debate would focus on similar issues, but be couched in different terms and I think there would be less digging in of heels. I'd say that the Smithsonian, like most advocates of scientific authority, appears to be more worried about being right about P vs ~P, and less concerned about moving stasis forward so we can actually make the best gamble that we can.