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>But that doesn’t get you safety or improvements. Yes, it does, because it makes people accountable for their actions and makes them fear punishment, so they'l
by magduf 7y ago
>But that doesn’t get you safety or improvements.
Yes, it does, because it makes people accountable for their actions and makes them fear punishment, so they'll avoid criminal actions in the first place.
>You can’t test anything infinitely, you can’t predict the future, all you can do is have standards and processes and a willingness to learn from mistakes.
Sounds great, so why didn't Boeing and the FAA do that? That's the thing that makes them criminally liable.
"Bad guys" are supposed to get put away when they intentionally do things that get people hurt or killed. This is called "criminal negligence", which is what Boeing is guilty of. People don't go to jail for mere accidents; they have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to have acted negligent to a criminal degree (i.e., usually intentionally). Boeing intentionally made design decisions that were contrary to safety, and then intentionally tried to hide what had happened and keep the planes in the air even though they were deadly.
>Turning collections of mistakes into crimes doesn’t prevent future mistakes.
Yes, it does, when those "mistakes" were criminal negligence. That's why we have laws that makes these mistakes criminal.
- colechristensen 7y agoFear of punishment means a culture of preventing punishment by never admitting failure, never “ratting” any colleagues out for failure, and treating investigators like enemies. Look at police and healthcare to see how badly your strategy works. You are passing a lot of judgement with almost no information besides a few newspaper articles cashing in on the public interest by speculating. I am either not selling the idea of an open culture towards failure very well or such conversations really attract people who like blame, vengeance, and pitchforks.
- magduf 7y agoI'm not proposing punishing people for making mistakes, I'm claiming that punishing people for criminal negligence is absolutely useful, and the court system thankfully agrees. Is this really a hard concept for you? >You are passing a lot of judgement with almost no information besides a few newspaper articles cashing in on the public interest by speculating. Bullshit. There has been more that sufficient information unearthed in the last half-year or so about the criminal negligence that Boeing committed, and how the FAA simply looked the other way. This is not arguable at this point.
- colechristensen 7y agoPeople who care about blaming and punishing are focusing on vengeance instead of prevention. You are just so incredibly certain. Why have investigations at all, magduf knows. And after the blaming and punishment is decided, people with that attitude don’t care about the issue any more. Problem solved until the next thing happens and we need to hang somebody new.
- magduf 7y agoYour response is obnoxious and patronizing, and you can shove it. Yes, I do know. It's been in the news for the better part of a year now; the causes of these plane crashes have been thoroughly investigated, and completely publicized. We know full well exactly why these crashes happened now, and the decisions that led up them. So yes, punishment is completely warranted when it's been proven that these hundreds of lives were lost because of willful criminal negligence. Do you work for Boeing or something?
- FabHK 7y agoDo you have any sources for that? I'd agree with the GP: one reason for the astounding safety in aviation is the conscious decision to leave blame and criminalisation out of the picture, and focus instead on the causes and prevention of accidents. What you wrote goes against everything I know about aviation safety. As an example, every NTSB report comes with this explicit disclaimer: > The NTSB does not assign fault or blame for an accident or incident; rather, as specified by NTSB regulation, “accident/incident investigations are fact-finding proceedings with no formal issues and no adverse parties ... and are not conducted for the purpose of determining the rights or liabilities of any person.” 49 C.F.R. § 831.4. Assignment of fault or legal liability is not relevant to the NTSB’s statutory mission to improve transportation safety by investigating accidents and incidents and issuing safety recommendations. In addition, statutory language prohibits the admission into evidence or use of any part of an NTSB report related to an accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b).
- magduf 7y ago>What you wrote goes against everything I know about aviation safety. You think "aviation safety" means that outright criminal negligence should go unpunished? That goes against all common sense.
- colechristensen 7y ago>You think "aviation safety" means that outright criminal negligence should go unpunished? That goes against all common sense. Ultimately, mostly. It requires you to think bigger, to expect mistakes and wrongdoing, and focus on ways to prevent the ultimate effect “plane crash” and not an intermediate cause (mistakes, negligence, fraud, laziness, stupidity, random acts of god, etc) You have to think of humans as part of the system and failure too. Humans fail just like steel beams fail. You need to engineer for it and not blame your tools and materials when your system fails, but how the system is designed instead (and not by fixing the designers by putting them in jail but by fixing the design) You do this by striving to understand failures when they happen (not by pointing fingers and insisting on prison) As you understand individual causes of failure you look back a step further and a step further until you are satisfied that youve fixed the immediate problem and everything that let it happen. You don’t stop when you find out that Bob is lazy and a liar and didn’t do his job. It’s naive and dangerous to think that there won’t be another Bob next time or that whatever you do to punish Bob will eliminate all Bobs from the future forever. You want to fix what design principles weren’t there that led to the faulty design, then the tests that didn’t catch it, then the testing requirements that didn’t make appropriate tests, then the auditing that didn’t catch the laps, then the acceptance tests, pilot reporting pipeline and prioritization, incident response lapses, missing regulation, missing enforcement audit, wrong training, missing law, missing insurance requirement, missing risk notification, change notification, process overcomplexity analysis, and on and on and on. Flying people around is hugely complex and involves many many actors. Too many of them to say the buck stops anywhere. Every responsibility for correct action is shared over several organization and thousands of people. Finding which ones to hang is counterproductive to safety if you’re actually trying to improve because it’s a distraction and theres never one single point of failure, there are a whole series of things that have to go wrong and if they do and it is actually only a few people responsible then it is everyone’s fault for being foolish enough for letting it get that way. Punishment can be there as an afterthought for particularly egregious acts, but if it os the main focus you are accepting and encouraging failure and ensuring that regularly you will be hanging Bobs in the village square.