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Dayum...just how far do the turtles go? Even when they reach full source bootstrap, are they ruminating over concerns about the firmware/BIOS? If those concern

Dayum...just how far do the turtles go? Even when they reach full source bootstrap, are they ruminating over concerns about the firmware/BIOS? If those concerns are addressed with an equivalent bootstrap-seeded coreboot, then are there concerns with the silicon? I never even thought someone was taking this level of security seriously enough to actually put the effort into it, but I'm extremely glad to see they are. I can easily see high-security DevOps builds of secrets management stores driven by such a bootstrapped Guix to nearly indefinitely satisfy the provenance-type questions from the regulatory compliance teams I work with.

secraetomani 7y ago
> secrets management stores Maybe starting from something like an Arduino is a better route for that.
- everlastingfan 7y ago
  Is Arduino firmware open? Are the PCB and chip designs open?
  - secraetomani 7y ago
    Even if not, way less stuff hiding in there than in your average computer. Remember that these days, Intel CPUs have web-servers embedded in them.
  - kragen 7y ago
    Yes, yes, and no. Also the compilation toolchain depends on GCC. Open silicon designs aren't enough; you need to be able to verify that the design correctly describes the physical hardware you are actually using.
z29LiTp5qUC30n 7y ago
well if you look at #bootstrappable's logs it looks like they are planning on building custom hardware out of TTL chips to eliminate all software/bios/firmware from the bootstrap; which when combined with libresilicon means no place for any attacks to hide.
- nwah1 7y ago
  Unless Dennis Ritchie or Ken Thompson placed a "trusting trust" attack in the original C compiler, since virtually all modern code was compiled by something that was once compiled by it. (Ken Thompson coined the term and knows how to do it.)
  - newnewpdro 7y ago
    That's the whole point of these projects - they're preventing that type of attack. If you implement your bootstrap C compiler entirely in machine code for instance, it doesn't matter if the "original C compiler" is compromised, since it's not being compiled.
  - pdw 7y ago
    To counter that, they're working on a bootstrap chain that starts with a tiny 500 byte hex editor and ends with a compiler that can build the GNU toolchain.
- everlastingfan 7y ago
  Well there is when you design signals that play on the physical properties of the silicon and the silicon design is known, think Rowhammer. The next level of this is making permanent modifications to the silicon, e.g. using focused RF signals to change the properties of individual transistors. Relying on security through obscurity is bad, but you need some obscurity. Passwords and keyfiles are ultimately a form of security through obscurity.
- jtl999 7y ago
  >building custom hardware out of TTL chips to eliminate all software/bios/firmware from the bootstrap I'd be curious to learn more about this.
- kragen 7y ago
  “Planning on” is an exaggeration. It would be good if someone did that, but those 120MB are still five orders of magnitude bigger than the MES seed, and that's a much bigger problem right now.
everlastingfan 7y ago
It's turtles all the way down. I'm ruminating on the potential for "regular" electric signals to carry quantum information, that's the next aspect of security to consider with quantum around the corner. So don't worry, there are and will be bigger things to worry about.
chungy 7y ago
Malicious firmware concerns might be alleviated with cross-compilation. There might be an assumption that firmware inserting untrusted code only actually inserts trusted code of its native architecture, though even this is no guarantee.
orblivion 7y ago
If you're worried enough, I think there's some trick where you use multiple different C compilers made by different organizations to build (let's say) gcc. Then you use all those gccs to rebuild gcc in a deterministic way. If all of those rebuilt gccs are byte-for-byte the same, then either it's safe, or all of the initial compilers you used were in cahoots. Depending on who you pick to start, that's arguably very unlikely.
- thfuran 7y ago
  >If all of those rebuilt gccs are byte-for-byte the same Isn't that pretty unlikely even if all the compilers are uncompromised?
  - delroth 7y ago
    No, that's what reproducible builds are all about: https://reproducible-builds.org/ https://reproducible-builds.org/ Debian is currently sitting at around 93% of packages being reproducibly built. NixOS is close to 99% of the minimal install image set (https://r13y.com/ https://r13y.com/).
    - tjoff 7y ago
      Reproducible builds don't mean compiling with different compilers, or even different versions of the same compiler, to result in the same binary.
      - comex 7y ago
        That's why you don't compare the GCC binaries built by different compilers. Instead, you use each of those GCC binaries (which may use different machine code but should implement the exact same functionality) to build another GCC, and you compare those binaries. That should result in identical binaries as long as GCC: - is deterministic, - does not invoke undefined behavior, and - was correctly compiled by the original compilers.
mikelevins 7y ago
There are researchers considering things all the way down to silicon. I worked on a contract for about a year and a half on a subproject of the research program described in this New York Times article: https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/30/science/rethinking-the-computer-at-80.html The project I consulted on was an attempt at a comprehensive system design that replaced everything all the way down to and including the hardware. System software was written in Haskell and in a newly-designed language called Breeze that offered both static and dynamic typing. The dynamic typing was supported by tagged hardware with specialized instructions (that effort included Tom Knight, one of the original designers of Lisp Machines). The organizing principle was that every piece of code and data was owned by a well-defined system entity with well-defined permissions that were proven correct both statically and dynamically. For example, sending data to an endpoint that did not have the required authorization to receive it was a type error. The thinking was that the state of the art is so broken (from the point of view of data integrity and security) that it's necessary to start from scratch. The overarching project name, appropriately enough, was "Clean Slate". I don't know what they're up to now.

secraetomani 7y ago

> secrets management stores Maybe starting from something like an Arduino is a better route for that.

everlastingfan 7y ago
Is Arduino firmware open? Are the PCB and chip designs open?
- secraetomani 7y ago
  Even if not, way less stuff hiding in there than in your average computer. Remember that these days, Intel CPUs have web-servers embedded in them.
- kragen 7y ago
  Yes, yes, and no. Also the compilation toolchain depends on GCC. Open silicon designs aren't enough; you need to be able to verify that the design correctly describes the physical hardware you are actually using.

z29LiTp5qUC30n 7y ago

well if you look at #bootstrappable's logs it looks like they are planning on building custom hardware out of TTL chips to eliminate all software/bios/firmware from the bootstrap; which when combined with libresilicon means no place for any attacks to hide.

nwah1 7y ago
Unless Dennis Ritchie or Ken Thompson placed a "trusting trust" attack in the original C compiler, since virtually all modern code was compiled by something that was once compiled by it. (Ken Thompson coined the term and knows how to do it.)
- newnewpdro 7y ago
  That's the whole point of these projects - they're preventing that type of attack. If you implement your bootstrap C compiler entirely in machine code for instance, it doesn't matter if the "original C compiler" is compromised, since it's not being compiled.
- pdw 7y ago
  To counter that, they're working on a bootstrap chain that starts with a tiny 500 byte hex editor and ends with a compiler that can build the GNU toolchain.
everlastingfan 7y ago
Well there is when you design signals that play on the physical properties of the silicon and the silicon design is known, think Rowhammer. The next level of this is making permanent modifications to the silicon, e.g. using focused RF signals to change the properties of individual transistors. Relying on security through obscurity is bad, but you need some obscurity. Passwords and keyfiles are ultimately a form of security through obscurity.
jtl999 7y ago
>building custom hardware out of TTL chips to eliminate all software/bios/firmware from the bootstrap I'd be curious to learn more about this.
kragen 7y ago
“Planning on” is an exaggeration. It would be good if someone did that, but those 120MB are still five orders of magnitude bigger than the MES seed, and that's a much bigger problem right now.

everlastingfan 7y ago

It's turtles all the way down. I'm ruminating on the potential for "regular" electric signals to carry quantum information, that's the next aspect of security to consider with quantum around the corner. So don't worry, there are and will be bigger things to worry about.

chungy 7y ago

Malicious firmware concerns might be alleviated with cross-compilation. There might be an assumption that firmware inserting untrusted code only actually inserts trusted code of its native architecture, though even this is no guarantee.

orblivion 7y ago

If you're worried enough, I think there's some trick where you use multiple different C compilers made by different organizations to build (let's say) gcc. Then you use all those gccs to rebuild gcc in a deterministic way. If all of those rebuilt gccs are byte-for-byte the same, then either it's safe, or all of the initial compilers you used were in cahoots. Depending on who you pick to start, that's arguably very unlikely.

thfuran 7y ago
>If all of those rebuilt gccs are byte-for-byte the same Isn't that pretty unlikely even if all the compilers are uncompromised?
- delroth 7y ago
  No, that's what reproducible builds are all about: https://reproducible-builds.org/ https://reproducible-builds.org/ Debian is currently sitting at around 93% of packages being reproducibly built. NixOS is close to 99% of the minimal install image set (https://r13y.com/ https://r13y.com/).
  - tjoff 7y ago
    Reproducible builds don't mean compiling with different compilers, or even different versions of the same compiler, to result in the same binary.
    - comex 7y ago
      That's why you don't compare the GCC binaries built by different compilers. Instead, you use each of those GCC binaries (which may use different machine code but should implement the exact same functionality) to build another GCC, and you compare those binaries. That should result in identical binaries as long as GCC: - is deterministic, - does not invoke undefined behavior, and - was correctly compiled by the original compilers.

mikelevins 7y ago

There are researchers considering things all the way down to silicon. I worked on a contract for about a year and a half on a subproject of the research program described in this New York Times article: https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/30/science/rethinking-the-computer-at-80.html The project I consulted on was an attempt at a comprehensive system design that replaced everything all the way down to and including the hardware. System software was written in Haskell and in a newly-designed language called Breeze that offered both static and dynamic typing. The dynamic typing was supported by tagged hardware with specialized instructions (that effort included Tom Knight, one of the original designers of Lisp Machines). The organizing principle was that every piece of code and data was owned by a well-defined system entity with well-defined permissions that were proven correct both statically and dynamically. For example, sending data to an endpoint that did not have the required authorization to receive it was a type error. The thinking was that the state of the art is so broken (from the point of view of data integrity and security) that it's necessary to start from scratch. The overarching project name, appropriately enough, was "Clean Slate". I don't know what they're up to now.