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> The metadata leaks alone should lead you to conclude that this isn't worth doing I don't buy that argument. Every time I can remember where I've wanted to us
by tzs 7y ago
> The metadata leaks alone should lead you to conclude that this isn't worth doing
I don't buy that argument. Every time I can remember where I've wanted to use email encryption has been a situation where I was fine with the metadata leaks. E.g., it was email to someone I regularly correspond with, on a subject we regularly correspond on, at a time when we would be expected to be corresponding on this subject. It only differed from our normal correspondence in that I had one or two things I wanted to include in the body that were more sensitive than normal.
- tptacek 7y agoLike Key Compromise Impersonation in a serious cryptosystem, metadata leaks are just a design flaw. They might not matter in most or even many situations, but when they do matter, they matter a lot. There is no reason to have them; we accept them in PGP because we unduly venerate a 1990s protocol that people have used to organize IRL parties. The two real reasons to avoid encrypted email are: 1. There's no realistic way to do it with forward secrecy, so any point-in-time compromise of a key --- which is inevitable --- will decrypt every message ever sent through that user. 2. Email is default-plaintext, and most people who have used PGP or S/MIME "at scale" have seen people repeatedly forget or misconfigure and send plaintext replies to encrypted emails, often with the plaintext of previous messages quoted. Both of those reasons are, for me, dispositive.