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Passive safety makes it sure that clueless operator can only result in a safe shutdown of the core and that it is physically impossible to maintain supercritica
by Iv 7y ago
Passive safety makes it sure that clueless operator can only result in a safe shutdown of the core and that it is physically impossible to maintain supercriticality in a core, basically by making it melt and separate into several sub-critical components.
- moneytide1 7y agoIt sounds like this measure would have prevented Chernobyl. The problem there wasn't all human operator - cheap graphite tips on the control rods?
- p_l 7y agoIt wasn't being cheap, but accepting things that didn't pass Soviet safety rules was one, another was that the process was not followed. Same design RBMK reactors have been operated for years without issue, but the Chernobyl plant did a test in wrong order,meaning that the safety measures that were backups for the tests... Weren't running. After significant human process training, the rest of Chernobyl NPP operated till around 2005
- moneytide1 7y agoInstead of us being frightened away from the benefits of nuclear because of the detriment demonstrated by the disaster, we should view Chernobyl as a necessary mistake meant to permanently lock in standards for even the most careless of governments. Even Fukushima comes to mind, even though a larger-than-expected natural disaster was the cause. After parsing the Wiki: "... the switching stations that sent power from these backup generators to the reactors' cooling systems for Units 1 through 5 were still in the poorly protected turbine buildings..." Sounds like there was still human engineering negligence. Perhaps that can teach us to restrict new reactors inland. As some have pointed out in this thread, oil sand waste dumps could ultimately be more harmful than nuclear waste...