5 ms·
I often wonder how much of a practical threat the exploits which updates fix really are; it seems like the majority of them are either local privilege escalatio
by userbinator 7y ago
I often wonder how much of a practical threat the exploits which updates fix really are; it seems like the majority of them are either local privilege escalation or exploit a listening service, all of which won't much affect the typical situation of a single-user PC behind a NAT with no forwarded ports and a user who won't be downloading and running random binaries from strangers (a bad idea regardless of how many updates you install...) Fortunately, the truly scary scenario of an attacker taking control over the Internet of a machine that is just left on and with no action needed on the part of the user seems quite rare; in fact, something like that would be very memorable, yet I don't remember any in at least the decade. The closest to that would be Heartbleed, and that wasn't specific to Windows.
IMHO Microsoft really alienated users starting with Win8's horrible UI changes, and the incessant "telemetry" spyware that grew profusely in the versions after that certainly did not help at all to restore any trust. Using security updates as an excuse to bundle other unwanted changes is also aggravating.
- infosack 7y ago> it seems like the majority of them are either local privilege escalation or exploit a listening service, all of which won't much affect the typical situation of a single-user PC behind a NAT with no forwarded ports and a user who won't be downloading and running random binaries from strangers Browser exploit chains often end up attacking the kernel or local services as part of escaping the sandbox, so it's important to patch these vulnerabilities. > Fortunately, the truly scary scenario of an attacker taking control over the Internet of a machine that is just left on and with no action needed on the part of the user seems quite rare; in fact, something like that would be very memorable, yet I don't remember any in at least the decade. EternalBlue, which exploited a vulnerability in SMB, is probably the most prominent example in recent times. BlueKeep, an RDP exploit, was another serious threat from earlier this year.
- userbinator 7y agoYes, browser exploits are always worrisome, which is partly the reason I have JS off by default. RDP and SMB aren't exploitable from the Internet if you're behind a NAT
- infosack 7y ago> Yes, browser exploits are always worrisome, which is partly the reason I have JS off by default. That is your personal preference of course, but it's highly atypical for any user to have JavaScript disabled. I was just pointing out that the attack surface isn't limited to downloading and running random binaries. > RDP and SMB aren't exploitable from the Internet if you're behind a NAT Unless they've forwarded the ports. But either way there are millions of hosts with RDP and SMB exposed (e.g. Shodan reports 5 million of the former and 1.5 million of the latter).
- userbinator 7y agoExploits or not, exposing those services to the Internet is a bad idea. If it weren't for NAT that number would probably be much higher...
- z3t4 7y agoIf you are a developer, make sure you make your app secure by default, eg. not listening on a public IP using a standard password. Don't fall in the trap of insecurity by convenience. Too many developers expect users to have NAT, that's why we can never adopt IPv6 for end users, and IoT will never take off until we get our shit together and make our software secure.
- EvanAnderson 7y agoThe "behind a NAT" argument fell apart back in the days of the Nimda worm (2001) in my experience. I saw multiple environments where vulnerable machines were infected when portable computers became infected while attached to third-party networks and were subsequently brought back "behind the firewall" to infect other machines. The lack of defense in depth, lack of segmentation, and the general "soft, chewy center" of most networks is arguably the cause to blame. Still, most third-party networks I see even today are this way.
- nisa 7y agoAutomated ransomware-trojan that is delivered to your browser with ads doesn't care. This is probably mostly about government or small buisness installs that run an Active Directory and the whole company would be dead without that infrastructure. > it seems like the majority of them are either local privilege escalation look up mimikatz, your automated ransomware just got domain-admin on your Active Directory because the part-time admin just used his domain admin login to run an anti-rootkit antivirus tool to fight the trojan the intern somehow got installed... > exploit a listening service your automated ransomware bot just got access to all your machines.
- technion 7y agoIt's worth noting there is some really nice Mimikatz mitigations in Windows 10, that you don't get in a "patched Windows 7".
- jm4 7y agoIt’s huge in a corporate environment. Unpatched machines and clueless users are the biggest threats. Everyone has clueless users and they can be dealt with. If you have unpatched machines then you have no control over your environment and it’s only a matter of time before you’re breached, assuming it hasn’t happened already and you don’t know it.