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In many economies, ISPs have legal immunity from acts done by users (customers) because of laws associated with 'common carrier' status. But that status is fra
by ggm 7y ago
In many economies, ISPs have legal immunity from acts done by users (customers) because of laws associated with 'common carrier' status.
But that status is fragile. The ISP has to act like it knows its obligations in law, and there are things ISPs have been doing to work with LEA for a long long time, which they won't be able to do as simply, or as well, or in some cases at all.
As a customer its easy to assume the only answer is "good" but in fact, its more complex. Society depends on law, and the application of law around what people do online is not trivial, and does not reduce down to 'all snooping is always bad all the time' -Warrants exist to do things, and warrant canaries are a reaction to them but not one which says warrants don't exist: they say silent warrants should not be obligated on the receiver of the interception: They're a position on secret law, not a position on law in itself.
TL;DR DoH and DoT are challenging established law in telecoms and big ISPs who have common-carrier defence depend on interception in DNS and DPI and the like, to perform their role facing LEA demands from the state which in many cases are entirely normal and justified
Not all DoH and DoT stories are good stories for society at large.
Please don't reduce this to a libertarian vs everyone else debate, I would invite you to think about what an ISP is, and what we want from ISPs as a whole, not just as customers seeking pirate bay, but as a society investing in a telecommunications-rich future.
The first casualty of war is the truth. The second (in WWI and WWII) was the deep sea telecommunications cables.
- zamadatix 7y agoDoH and DoT are just new delivery technologies. You've always been able to securely tunnel your traffic out of the country and you always will as it's trivial. DoT changing the resolver from one public company in the to another public company of the will not prevent the government from issuing warrants, particularly since they already issue warrants to these companies as it is. Common carrier defence is not going to be lost from encrypting URLs, the same FUD was spread about encrypted banking then the encryption of most websites. The only thing that has resulted from the increase in encryption is the decrease of ISP injected ads and the decrease of customer tracking information being sold.
- ggm 7y agoThere is a volume of ability north of 95% which could be lost, and the ISP has a mechanism to act (block DoT) but in DoH, its less simple. Hence, the liaison between Mozilla and Google, and state authorities. Why do you think Mozilla turns this on selectively?
- shakna 7y ago> The ISP has to act like it knows its obligations in law, and there are things ISPs have been doing to work with LEA for a long long time, which they won't be able to do as simply, or as well, or in some cases at all. As I understand the current caselaw, whilst an ISP is required to make some efforts, they are not required to make efforts when a task is impossible or difficult. If an ISP is required to create a porn filter, for example, they aren't also required to try and forward that blocker across Tor. Rather a "best effort" is exactly what is legally required. So when a new technology is adopted that makes their previous "best efforts" obsolete, then they will no longer be forced to attempt something that is no longer possible. However, that whole conversation is mute when it comes to this particular instance. Google will attempt to use the ISP's own DoH resolver. So the answer is simply to run one, or not. If Chrome can't find a DoH with the current DNS, it'll fallback to today's behaviour. This isn't changing the status quo at all. It's only a problem if customers move wide-scale away from the ISP's own DNS servers. Which happens when the ISP's interests conflict with the user's already, so again, no change to the status quo.
- profmonocle 7y agoI'm not sure what the issue is. My ISP can still intercept my DNS traffic and provide it to law enforcement. If it's unreadable because of encryption, how is that different than the fact that all my HTTPS requests are similarly unreadable? They can't provide what they don't have. ISPs in the US (and I presume most countries) aren't obligated to ensure their customers don't use encryption.
- BLKNSLVR 7y agoThe fact that an ISP can snoop customers' data and DNS requests is a side-effect of their business. I don't buy any of the 'responsibility to law enforcement' argument at all, for a number of reasons but the one pertinent to this issue is that privacy legislation is about 30-years out of date - and it's basically this legislation-lag that's the loophole allowing ISPs to do whatever they want with the data. And it's legislation that no Government is in any hurry to amend because it serves their purposes in maintaining the façade of 'keeping our citizens safe'. Additionally, this statement is almost entirely the opposite of my understanding. DoH ENSURES that ISPs cannot be held responsible at least for the DNS content since they cannot see it for technical reasons: TL;DR DoH and DoT are challenging established law in telecoms and big ISPs who have common-carrier defence depend on interception in DNS and DPI and the like, to perform their role facing LEA demands from the state which in many cases are entirely normal and justified