Right, or just use *BSD where /dev/{u,}random both behave correctly :) I'm not the same guy, so I have no idea what he was reading /dev/random for. Just pointi

Right, or just use *BSD where /dev/{u,}random both behave correctly :) I'm not the same guy, so I have no idea what he was reading /dev/random for. Just pointing out that it can in fact be "exhausted." I'm not a crypto expert either, but wouldn't it still make sense to use /dev/random when generating long-lived keys (e.g. PGP, SSL CA, ssh keys...)? I understand, I think, that a CSPRNG seeded with just the minimum amount of entropy should be "good enough." More entropy has to be at least theoretically better though, doesn't it? If the only tradeoff is having to wait a few more seconds or possibly minutes to generate a key I'm going to use for years... why wouldn't I want to do that?