I am simply pointing out what can and cannot be deduced just from these CFRs. Evidence showing directly that the 737 MAX (without MCAS) was found to be divergen

I am simply pointing out what can and cannot be deduced just from these CFRs. Evidence showing directly that the 737 MAX (without MCAS) was found to be divergent within the operational scope of the CFRs (which excludes, for example, CofG well behind the aft limit), would be more persuasive than these specific CFRs themselves. Your comment about earlier 737s is informative, as the time taken to return to trim speed is not a parameter in the CFRs in question. Given that response time, could there have been any plausible doubt that the 737 MAX would require some additional form of stability augmentation? The story, as commonly told, is that MCAS was a response to an unanticipated problem, but now I am wondering if Boeing knew from the start that it would likely have to withold information in order to keep its 'no new training' pledge. While we are on the topic of what the CFRs say, they also do not support the often-repeated claim that the purpose of MCAS is as a stall-prevention device, which is where this thread started.