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I think it's hilarious that I discuss the test methods, cite the CFR, and mention the actual test results, and in turn you paste back the CFR to me that I cited
by mlyle 7y ago
I think it's hilarious that I discuss the test methods, cite the CFR, and mention the actual test results, and in turn you paste back the CFR to me that I cited. Thanks!
737's with smaller engines have very close to neutral pitch stability when at high AOA and high thrust. It takes 5ever to get back to trim speed. 737 MAX is even worse; depending on CG it can be divergent.
Gesticulating about stick forces and "handling" is obfuscation and misses the point. Yes, that's fucked up, too. The descriptions of allowing you to pull "harder" assume you're not trimmed for the climb and are holding a constant pull, which uh, some crews do, but autopilot won't (it'll trim off those forces), and lazy crews with weak arms like me won't either. :P
- mannykannot 7y agoI am simply pointing out what can and cannot be deduced just from these CFRs. Evidence showing directly that the 737 MAX (without MCAS) was found to be divergent within the operational scope of the CFRs (which excludes, for example, CofG well behind the aft limit), would be more persuasive than these specific CFRs themselves. Your comment about earlier 737s is informative, as the time taken to return to trim speed is not a parameter in the CFRs in question. Given that response time, could there have been any plausible doubt that the 737 MAX would require some additional form of stability augmentation? The story, as commonly told, is that MCAS was a response to an unanticipated problem, but now I am wondering if Boeing knew from the start that it would likely have to withold information in order to keep its 'no new training' pledge. While we are on the topic of what the CFRs say, they also do not support the often-repeated claim that the purpose of MCAS is as a stall-prevention device, which is where this thread started.