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Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems
- bambax 7y ago> even supporting cryptographic authentication on ILS signals would still leave systems vulnerable to record and replay attacks Not necessarily? It should be possible to encode at least a timestamp so that a replay wouldn't work; or even implement a challenge-response so that each plane has their own signal? Not trivial of course but possible...?
- yorwba 7y agoAs I understood the article, localization is based on signal strength, so cryptographically protecting the signal content is absolutely useless against an attacker who simply amplifies the signal without modifying it.
- TickleSteve 7y agoThe normal defence against replay attacks is to use a framecounter rather than a timestamp. Either way, there are normal crypto techniques to resolve this issue.
- krisoft 7y agoOut of curiosity: airplane receives the broadcasted properly signed packets with frame counter included. How does it know if the antenna broadcasting is the official one or one replaying the official at 2 miles south of the normal glideslope?
- TickleSteve 7y agothis does not solve the original issue of signal strength being faked.... but... Authentication provides this, not encryption. The receivers would need a valid certficate to authenticate the transmission.
- throw0101a 7y ago> * How does it know if the antenna broadcasting is the official one or one replaying the official at 2 miles south of the normal glideslope?* With multipole antennas, one can use MLat to determine where the signal came from: * http://www.multilateration.com/surveillance/multilateration.html http://www.multilateration.com/surveillance/multilateration.... * http://www.navcanada.ca/EN/products-and-services/Pages/on-board-operational-initiatives-mlat.aspx http://www.navcanada.ca/EN/products-and-services/Pages/on-bo... * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multilateration https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multilateration If the signal was received on the antenna pointing forward, then the signal probably came from where you're headed; if it came from an antenna off to the side, then someone may be spoofing.
- michaelt 7y agoGPS replay attacks only need to delay a signal by a very small amount - after all, a radio signal travels 300 meters in a microsecond. And the GPS C/A code has a bandwidth of 1 MHz - 1 microsecond per bit. Neither frame counters nor timestamps are sufficient to robustly detect a replay attack that delays the signal by a fraction of a single bit.
- elif 7y agoThis does not strike me as ethical disclosure. It would, as the author himself describes it, take a redesign of every craft, before making this research public would be safe. He put a smiley face by the suggestion to use a drone transmitter FFS.
- raverbashing 7y agoWell it's not "Ethical disclosure" but it's not like how ILS works is a big mystery or that pilots blindingly follow ILS with no other backups or guidance systems.
- fyfy18 7y agoI'm interested to know if the test pilot in their simulator knew this was going to happen or not. I'm thinking if they knew the risk (which this disclosure provides) they may have been more aware and have seen there was a problem. I can't imagine a pilot not being able to spot being off course, even by a small amount, given pilots are able to land large aircraft by visual aids only (however commercial pilots don't do it often).
- scoopertrooper 7y agoIt could be a severe problem in low visibility conditions.
- t0mas88 7y agoWe land visually all the time. Especially in the US it is super common to be cleared for a visual approach, because it increases the runway capacity (can fly closer together if you can see the plane ahead and follow them). You would have the ILS (or GPS based approach) as a backup on your screens to verify. If what you see out the window does not match the systems, you stop the approach, climb, take some time to "debug" and then try again.
- jrockway 7y agoThis attack is obvious to anyone that knows about ILS and radio. The article is a nice introduction if you've never heard about ILS... but it's not a difficult attack. If someone wants to do this, they would have done it by now. I think the defense against this attack is noticing that the needle isn't moving according to any control inputs. If you're on course and the needle suddenly deflects (as opposed to moving gradually), that's something to think about. If you're off course and you fly the airplane towards the needle and it doesn't move, you're going to think twice. Presumably this realization would occur before descending too low, so it's not a major problem. Ultimately, though, if someone is jamming the ILS and it is really a zero-visibility situation... you will have to divert to another airport. Flight planning requires that fuel for that be available... so it's somewhat unlikely that someone who reads HN and gets an SDR on eBay is going to kill a lot of people this way.
- colechristensen 7y agoThere is already a replacement for ILS developed and in use at a couple of big US airports and some international ones. It consists mostly of a GPS station at an airport that broadcasts error corrections to aircraft who then use their corrected, satellite sourced GPS location data to land. https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/techops/navservices/gnss/faq/laas/ https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/at...
- capableweb 7y agoThe article ends with: > Are there any easily deployable defences? > No. > All of the backup systems, including GPS, fail to provide sufficient security guarantees, and even supporting cryptographic authentication on ILS signals would still leave systems vulnerable to record and replay attacks. So seems solving with GPS is not enough.
- colechristensen 7y agoBut those claims are not backed by anything. Neither "sufficient security guarantees" or how GPS systems fail to meet them is written anywhere.
- colechristensen 7y agoThe authors miss the simple defense of the air traffic controller politely asking the pilot where the heck they think they're going and a quick exchange that would result in all flights diverted and the FCC chasing down the van (or fleet of vans) with big radio transmitters and antennas.
- fyfy18 7y agoAre their systems accurate enough to identify an aircraft being 15m off the centerline of the runway? Take the incident at SFO a few years ago where an aircraft nearly landed on the taxiway - it was only detected by a pilot on the ground (on the taxi way) saying the approaching aircraft looks off course. https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/07/11/sfo-near-miss-air-canada-flight-got-extremely-close-to-planes-on-taxiway/ https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/07/11/sfo-near-miss-air-can...
- rlpb 7y agoOn a normal (CAT I) ILS approach, the pilot will land manually, visually, from a height of 200 feet. You'd have to confuse the pilot as well as the ILS; otherwise the pilot will go around on seeing the deviation (if it's not correctable).
- sokoloff 7y ago15m laterally is still well within the obstacle protected zone and would put the nosewheel onto pavement on most ILS-served runways (and probably all common airline ILS runways). It would take a small sidestep at 200’ AGL to put the offside main gear onto pavement.
- t0mas88 7y agoNo, ATC radar systems are not accurate enough to show such a small offset and also don't update fast enough. You could probably write an algorithm to have a computer check it, but the controller in the tower will not notice because this is less than 1 pixel on their screen.
- supernova87a 7y agoIt is an interesting vulnerablity. But the one advantage of ILS against such attacks is that each site is separate and to try this at scale would require lots of co-conspirators. It's not similar to a GPS or other system-wide exploit. Also, I guess you would need a highly directional antenna setup to be able to track a plane and overwhelm the legitimate ILS signal (i.e. why is that weird van parked here). Attempt this at even one airport and you'd have law enforcement / FAA on you very quickly with a penalty of getting sent to federal ass-pounding prison for tampering with life-critical navigation systems.
- t0mas88 7y agoThis. And also, the article claims: > Commercial flights typically fly CAT II or CAT III approaches. That's not true at all. We fly by far the most CAT I approaches, or visual with the navigation instruments only as a backup. To be allowed do a CAT II or CAT III approach, the ground environment needs to be managed differently by air traffic control. They will monitor and keep completely empty a big area around the ILS transmitters and the runway. Specifically to avoid any interference with the signals. Not even official airport cars are allowed in while doing CAT II or III operations. So anyone that would want to transmit something nefarious would be standing in an empty grass and asphalt area that is actively monitored by ATC.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- a012 7y agoA man was charged for jamming mobile phones signal while driving[0], so it's not hard for the authority to find the perpetrator. [0] https://www.theverge.com/2014/5/1/5672762/man-faces-48000-fine-for-driving-with-cellphone-jammer https://www.theverge.com/2014/5/1/5672762/man-faces-48000-fi...
- plxity 7y agoff
- t0mas88 7y agoTheir test setup isn't realistic at all and looks more like a way to make the article sound interesting. Several big errors: - They are testing a handheld radio that receives a single SDR signal. In reality a plane has two separate radios (different antenna locations) receiving a signal from a powerful antenna array at the end of the runway, that you try to squeeze your SDR signal in between. So the real attack is far different from their test setup, because you're going to have several conflicting signals instead of only one that they calculate in the test. - If you overpower the real signal, which needs a really strong transmitter, the monitoring equipment at the airport will easily detect it. That alerts the tower and they will not allow a plane to use the approach. This monitoring is even in place in simple en-route navigation beacons (VORs) - They claim to be able to make a plane land short of the runway, but every ILS approach has an altitude check by the pilots that's independent of the ILS signal. It works by checking the altitude based on air pressure (not spoofable) at a specific location (based on a system separate from ILS, usually DME or GPS) to the altitude at which the ILS puts the plane. If the two don't match, the pilots will break-off the approach. That check is not a nice to have, if you skip it at a flight-test (every 6 months) you would fail. - Their calculation needs to know where the plane really is. That's easy to pull from the API of X-Plane (the hobby computer game they use as their simulator) but you don't know in the real world, unless you can see the plane. If you can see the plane, the pilots can see the runway and they're not going to be flying a CAT II or CAT III approach. They also claim that no system exists to counteract this, but aircraft GPS systems all have mandatory error checking. If you fake a GPS signal, the receiver will compare it to the other signals and either ignore the fake signal (just like it will ignore a faulty satellite) or if not possible to calculate a correct position refuse to fly the approach. Another alternative already available for years is MLS (microwave landing system), that has a digital signal to tell the plane its position relative to the runway. You cannot fake that without making it obvious to the receiver that you have two conflicting signals and again refusing to fly the approach. A DoS attack on airplane landing systems is absolutely possible by jamming either ILS, MLS or GPS signals. But making an airliner land next to the runway is really not as easy as this article makes it sound.
- GistNoesis 7y agoHow resistant are those systems with respect to tampering with the physical antenna ? Would someone tilting the antenna a few degrees towards the ground with a screwdriver cause significant perturbation ? Would flying a drone just in front of the antenna be enough to cause a misread ? What about a well positioned actively controlled reflector ?
- mopsi 7y agoThe article fails to mention ILS integrity monitoring systems. They are mandatory for Cat II and Cat III operations. ILS degradation is a well-known risk and concerns are mostly associated with environmental effects like signal reflections from other aircraft or airport vehicles. 1979 FAA report "Far Field Monitor for Instrument Landing Systems" explores the issue in depth: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a079663.pdf https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a079663.pdf
- kens 7y agoThis is basically the plot of Die Hard 2 (1990), where bad guys take over the instrument landing system and make a plane crash on landing. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Die_Hard_2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Die_Hard_2
- tialaramex 7y agoSort of, you can see a real 747 pilot discuss the many inaccuracies (not that Die Hard intends to be a pseudo-documentary) here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GqLbUF-2nWk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GqLbUF-2nWk The most important thing the movie doesn't do that would happen in real life is, when there's any problem everybody diverts to their alternate, even including people queued up already to land. "Huh, they had some kind of problem, guess we should go to... uh... Baltimore? Find that for me and I'll let them know". Nobody's going to hang about waiting to see if they can get killed by terrorists. But yes, they also recalibrate the height wrong in the movie to kill a 747 full of passengers and that wouldn't work either.
- eternalny1 7y agoThis is going against ILS systems, but the world is changing. GPS WAAS is allowing approaches to minimums to almost any airport, even ones that do not have an ILS. https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/techops/navservices/gnss/library/factsheets/media/WAAS_QFSheets.pdf https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/at...
- forfengeligfaen 7y ago"Activate the instrument landing system but recalibrate sea level minus 200 feet."
- crankylinuxuser 7y agoTHIS is exactly what I'm talking about when I created my RadioInstigator tablet. https://hackaday.com/2019/06/05/mobile-sigint-hacking-on-a-civilians-budget/ https://hackaday.com/2019/06/05/mobile-sigint-hacking-on-a-c... Radio in all its forms has been considered a "safe" way to send and receive digital data. That was only because attacking signals was traditionally only in the hands of nation-states. The hardware and know-how was erudite and tremendously expensive. That quaint idea is no longer true. Locally, our city is installing IoT water monitors that chirp out consumption every 1/2-1h. A simple replay attack could cause peoples' water bills to go in excess of $30k. Our power meters are similar. The tornado siren alert structures also sit on 400MHz spectrum, and are trivial to remotely trigger with no way to turn off. The system was built to trust any radio signal that it understands, full stop. So seeing that planes are also attackable this way is obvious to me. Of course the authentication/authorization/auditing/encryption/signature part of the stack cost money, so was not included. What do we do? Well, We (royal) fix the grid in all places to do things right. Individually, be wary and very careful in the radios you put in your vicinity.
- nutcracker46 7y agoThe comments in here are pretty solid. I would just add a couple of points: 1) Spoofing both localizer and glideslope signals will not be easy. The glideslope transmits from an antenna beside the runway abeam the touchdown aim point, while the localizer antenna is at the far end of the runway. It would be difficult to overpower both at the aircraft without being detected by integrity sensors at the airport (possibly even "near the airport" in countries concerned with spoofing). You can't just light up a plane with signals of similar strength; the spoofer must be many many dB stronger. 2) Crews are trained to watch the plane and overall situation closely. Not only do they want to see the needles centered, but there are checks of altitude versus distance along the approach. That's DME distance versus altitude, VNAV profile, and "reasonable" radar altimeter data. 3) Any instability caused by the spoofing is likely to trip the on-board integrity sensing and cause an INOP alert on modern aircraft. Also, a hinky-jinky ride on an ILS that's been crudely spoofed may induce the crew to execute a missed aporoach. 3) With (augmented) GNSS and integrated, multi-mode navigation on modern aircraft, the crew will see a deviation from the correct path. 4) The (enhanced) ground proximity warning system would detect a movement trend toward "terrain other than the runway." Of course, if the target is not a well equipped, modern aircraft, spoofing the ILS may work. Alright, that's my 2 cents as a radio and cypherpunk with multiple Boeing type ratings...
- wiseleo 7y agoYou may find this interesting https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CXv1j3GbgLk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CXv1j3GbgLk in particular about the bleed of ATSB data from virtual world into real world. It's a semi-hypothetical Defcon presentation on insecure wireless communications directly with the aircraft.
- anorphirith 7y agothis should NOT be publicized. hundreds of people's lives are at risk and there are no workarounds for GA