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Checkm8 – Bootrom exploit for many iOS devices
- theshrike79 7y agoMore information on Twitter: https://twitter.com/axi0mX/status/1177542201670168576 https://twitter.com/axi0mX/status/1177542201670168576
- tsomctl 7y ago> This vulnerability can only be triggered over USB and requires physical access.
- MuffinFlavored 7y agoI can't easily tell by looking at the code what the actual exploit is or why it can't be patched in a new version of the bootloader.
- NightMKoder 7y agoThis looks like a bootrom exploit - the stage before iBoot - that verifies signatures of the firmware. The code for it is hard burned - read only from software. This can only be fixed with new hardware. https://www.theiphonewiki.com/wiki/Bootrom https://www.theiphonewiki.com/wiki/Bootrom
- florian_s 7y ago> What I am releasing today is not a full jailbreak with Cydia, just an exploit. Researchers and developers can use it to dump SecureROM, decrypt keybags with AES engine, and demote the device to enable JTAG. You still need additional hardware and software to use JTAG. > During iOS 12 betas in summer 2018, Apple patched a critical use-after-free vulnerability in iBoot USB code. This vulnerability can only be triggered over USB and requires physical access. It cannot be exploited remotely. I am sure many researchers have seen that patch.
- zeroimpl 7y agoIn particular, it sounds like the same or similar bug also existed in the bootrom. So Apple patched iBoot but can't patch the bootrom.
- Nextgrid 7y agoUnrelated but is it just me or does anyone else think the quality of the replies matches a typical YouTube comment section?
- jowsie 7y agoThat seems to be the norm on any twitter reply thread I've read, especially if the subject is something even remotely mainstream.
- xeroaura 7y agoA large part of the jailbreak user community is pretty young agewise. Lots of drama/immaturity/people quitting out of the scene due to toxicity. Some of the people crafting these released exploits into a functioning jailbreak are in college or below! There's a pretty big piracy problem as well (not just cracked iOS apps, but also cracked paid tweaks released by devs for jailbreak devices) probably due to the younger ages without access to $.
- fredsted 7y ago>Most generations of iPhones and iPads are vulnerable: from iPhone 4S (A5 chip) to iPhone 8 and iPhone X (A11 chip). Sounds like the iPhones Xs and 11 aren't vulnerable.
- zozbot234 7y agoWould this allow for booting alternative OS's, e.g. on unsupported/EOL devices?
- jeron 7y agoDefine alternative - this exploit means you could dual boot OSs, custom IPSWs, and downgrade at will Edit: also yes theoretically you can upgrade to any iOS version at will as well
- opan 7y agoI am hoping for a postmarketOS port for some of these devices. Especially the iPads with 120Hz screens.
- topranks 7y agoYes absolutely. Building reliable hardware support into your alternative OS is the hard bit though.
- segfaultbuserr 7y agoI still remember geohot's miracle of his limera1n exploit, which was an unpatchable iBoot exploit on iPhone 4. And now we have its successor - axi0mX's checkm8, still an iBoot exploit, still unpatchable. It seems to be another golden age for iOS jailbreaking has came! Also, just like limera1n, it requires total physical control over the device to run the exploit. A complete, untethered jailbreak still requires additional kernel/userspace exploits, so I don't see it as a major security problem, but it does make the job of an evil maid a bit easier. Just for nostalgia, here's the original release text of limera1n. > limera1n, 6 months in the making > iPhone 3GS, iPod Touch (3rd generation), iPad, iPhone 4, iPod Touch (4th generation) > 4.0-4.1 and beyond+++ > limera1n is unpatchable > untethered thanks to jailbreakme star comex > brought to you by geohot > hacktivates > Mac coming in 7 years > donations keep support alive > zero pictures of my face
- mstg 7y agoiBoot and BootROM is different. iBoot is software (patchable) while BootROM is read-only. Otherwise, agree! It's really a big achievement.
- roblabla 7y agoI'm very confused. On one hand, the tweet claims to have a bootrom exploit. On the other hand, the fifth tweet in the chain talks about an iBoot vulnerability that got patched in ios12 beta[1]. Maybe the vulnerable codepath has some code sharing between iBoot and SecureROM? [1]: https://twitter.com/axi0mX/status/1177544539046703104 https://twitter.com/axi0mX/status/1177544539046703104
- mstg 7y agoIf I've understood this correctly, it was an iBoot vulnerability enabling the exploitation of the BootROM vulnerability untethered (without connecting to a computer again). Since the iBoot vulnerability is patched, the phone has to be connected to a computer every time to boot if there has been any tinkering (custom FW or any change in boot sequence). So prepatch you could exploit the BootROM vulnerability untethered with the iBoot vulnerability, but postpatch have to connect to a computer to boot every time if you have done any tinkering which is why it is currently only adviced for security researchers. Tinkering with the BootROM also leads to invalidations of APTickets (so a future restore may be impossible without special gear).
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- londons_explore 7y agoParsing complex untrusted data (USB packets) without a sandbox at the highest privilege level... What were they thinking?
- uxp100 7y agoI don’t think they can avoid a usb device stack in bootrom. I haven’t read about this much yet, but without bootrom USB device mode support, the BL can’t be flashed on a bricked device. So, devices that are functional still, but somehow corrupted couldn’t be fixed in an Apple Store (or at home?). They’d likely be trash. I’m sure they have multiple redundant BLs, so I don’t know how often this actually happens. That USB code was surely the riskiest thing in the bootrom by far though. They will be re-evaluating if it is necessary in new chips. They also probably provision the devices with USB in the factory. But if that’s all the usb was for, I would suspect it would be disabled as the last step.
- dev_dull 7y agoCouldn’t they use some other wire format that simply uses the same port?
- uxp100 7y agoSpeed is a concern in the factory, and that would slow them down even if the alternate format was as fast as USB, which it probably wouldn't be. USB pads could be special and require additional work to mux with whatever the other format is. There are things they could do at the software level that could make sanitization easier too. But if they are really upset about this, they will consider it.
- kirb 7y agoApple actually used to do this on MacBooks - one of the USB ports has mux circuitry that can be switched to an SMC programming mode that merely uses USB as the physical connection for their SMC programmer tool, bypassing the USB host controller and not using the USB protocol. It was removed in the 2016 onwards MacBooks as the T1/T2 supersedes the SMC, so it follows the same design patterns as iPhone hardware.
- jplayer01 7y agoI'm confused. The github only refers to the iPhone 3GS. Further, might this be a vector for anybody with physical access to gain access to your encrypted data?
- theshrike79 7y agoGithub has the code for checkm8: https://github.com/axi0mX/ipwndfu/blob/master/checkm8.py https://github.com/axi0mX/ipwndfu/blob/master/checkm8.py The readme hasn't been updated to reflect the exploit yet.
- kirb 7y agoThe code is there but the readme wasn’t updated. See: https://twitter.com/axi0mX/status/1177542201670168576 https://twitter.com/axi0mX/status/1177542201670168576
- basch 7y agoI very much hope this gives me something i can ram boot and ssh into the filesystem of a non booting phone. Should also allow near universal downgrading.
- G4E 7y agoAfaik your second statement is sadly impossible. The system needs a blob "shsh" signed with an 1024 bits rsa key by Apple's server to install an upgrade or a downgrade. If this key is in the bootrom, you can't override it ?
- basch 7y agobut the iOS you install doesnt even need to be signed anymore. Im not an expert on this, but I would suspect you can delete the entire authorization step, wholesale.
- kirb 7y agoThis is true, so long as you accept that you need to use a PC to re-run the bootrom exploit every time you boot up the phone. The signature checks remain intact and the system will refuse to boot (goes to recovery mode with a “restore with iTunes” graphic) without the exploit patching out the checks.
- basch 7y agoIt just needs something to boot it, not necessarily a computer. I could see a market for something that looks like this. https://www.amazon.com/dp/B07GWLF4GR https://www.amazon.com/dp/B07GWLF4GR that fits in nearly flush.
- topranks 7y agoThe entire point of this exploit is to be able to bypass that and load any OS, signed by Apple or not. It should very much allow you to upgrade/downgrade iOS to your hearts content.
- cromka 7y agoWhy is it unpatchable? Even with physical access, via iTunes or something?
- arayh 7y agoIt exploits the bootrom, which is by definition unpatchable.
- uxp100 7y agoI suspect Apple has ways from the factory to fix this. Secure Fuses that can disable code paths, or inject code. But unpatchable in the field.
- saagarjha 7y agoIn the factory, Apple can just create new hardware without this flaw.
- uxp100 7y agoThat would be in the fab, not the factory, might mean tossing out inventory, and will take longer. I'm guessing they will do both.
- xurias 7y agoFuture devices can be fixed at the factory. That still leaves tens of millions of vulnerable devices which are, as repeated before, unpatchable.
- rvz 7y agoI haven't seen news like this in years since Geohot (founder of comma.ai) found the limera1n BootROM exploit for iPhone 4 and below. With this recent addition, we can have more freedom and control of our iPhones/iPads. This is indeed a glorious time and a good time to be in the Jailbreak community. This affects devices ranging from the iPhone 4S to the iPhone X. That is a large scope of vulnerable devices. This is equivalent to the Nintendo Switch BootROM exploit and allows all sorts of OSes such as Linux, Android to be installed on the iDevice.
- rahkiin 7y agoEverybody seems so happy about this, here on HN and on Twitter. But wouldn't this allow any law enforcement or bad actor to circumvent any device protections? Get the phone, do whatever you want with it without anything blocking you. Am I missing something or are all these device secure enclaves and fingerprint protection or key protection now moot?
- rescbr 7y agoAs far as I understand it, user data is still encrypted and the key is protected by the Secure Enclave, which is not affected. This exploit allows flashing unsigned firmware, so by stealing the phone the attackers won’t be able to decrypt your data, but an evil maid attack is now (or will be) feasible. Also, stolen iPhones are now more valuable, as you will be able to bypass iCloud Lock.
- rahkiin 7y agoSo this might increase theft, as it is more valuable than a mere brick now. I hope we get some word from Apple about this.
- mschuster91 7y ago> So this might increase theft, as it is more valuable than a mere brick now. Only for older models, the newest series is not vulnerable.
- oliveshell 7y agoThe vast majority of iPhones currently in use are “older models“ [1]. Only A12 and A13 devices are unaffected (XS/XR, 11). [1]: https://deviceatlas.com/blog/most-popular-iphones https://deviceatlas.com/blog/most-popular-iphones
- btbuilder 7y agoI don’t have deep knowledge of the security architecture here but, in general the key doesn’t need to be compromised to retrieve data in secure systems. What prevents unauthorized firmware from requesting that the Secure Enclave decrypt all data? Similar to having control over an HSM - you can’t extract the key but you can perform cryptographic operations.
- alibert 7y agoDo I understand this correctly: does this mean that every iOS device from iPhone 4 to iPhone 8 + iPhone X could be unlocked for data access if you had physical access to it? Also one of the following reply to the twitter link posted somewhere in the comment here [0] has the following: `During iOS 12 betas in summer 2018, Apple patched a critical use-after-free vulnerability in iBoot USB code. This vulnerability can only be triggered over USB and requires physical access. It cannot be exploited remotely. I am sure many researchers have seen that patch.` This could explain the recent price reduction of bounty for iOS (lower than Android) [1] [0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21091247 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21091247 [1] https://www.zdnet.com/article/android-exploits-are-now-worth-more-than-ios-exploits-for-the-first-time/ https://www.zdnet.com/article/android-exploits-are-now-worth...
- hnghost 7y agoAs per the wording of the article, that is the correct understanding.
- topranks 7y agoThe data on the device is encrypted. This allows you to install a different OS on the device, but it won’t be able to decrypt the users data without pin code. You could potentially flash a new firmware which contains a keylogger and sends the pin to someone. Or that waits for the user to enter it (decrypting the disk,) and then siphons off the data. But on your own with a stolen phone and this you won’t be able to read the data.
- amluto 7y agoBetter link: https://github.com/axi0mX/ipwndfu/commit/2d0abd321dfc947899f6b79cf2d189be9a622ab0 https://github.com/axi0mX/ipwndfu/commit/2d0abd321dfc947899f...
- nabakin 7y agoWas about to post this. I think it should be the title link.
- iaml 7y agoWith the current state of iOS 13 and now this, I'm guessing apple can kiss their 88% adoption rate[0] goodbye. [0] https://www.macrumors.com/2019/08/08/ios-12-adoption-88-percent/ https://www.macrumors.com/2019/08/08/ios-12-adoption-88-perc...
- CharlesW 7y agoUnlikely. iOS 13 (13.1) adoption is already 20% a week after release, effectively on par with iOS 12 at that time.
- ceejayoz 7y agoWhy would I avoid an OS update over a bootrom exploit?
- shyn3 7y agoThis should in theory increase the number of iOS users because who doesn't want a jail broken iPhone. I know I am going to switch from Android once a proper method is available. They should make it work for the new iPhone only instead in the future to increase sales.
- overcast 7y ago88% of iOS users don't even know what any of this means, and are blindly installing or auto-updating their devices.
- exabrial 7y ago"Physical access owns" You can make it inconvenient (for both users and attackers) but there is simply no escaping eventually someone with physical access will get in.
- als0 7y agoIt’s largely down to security economics. Boot ROMs can eventually be bypassed although difficult. But the real goal is actually to make it difficult enough such that you require physical access, specialised equipment and knowledge in order to pull it off - essentially making sure attacks are difficult to scale.
- DenisM 7y agoIt seems like everyone who owns affected phones has to carry a "usb condom" from now on. https://duckduckgo.com/?q=usb+condom&t=h_&ia=web https://duckduckgo.com/?q=usb+condom&t=h_&ia=web
- djrogers 7y agoNo, not the case. The device must be put into DFU mode before the exploit is attempted - it doesn't work on the phone in any other state.
- Wowfunhappy 7y agoIn addition, I don't know that you could actually extract any data through this exploit, due to SEP holding the keys.
- DenisM 7y agoThe idea is to plant a trojan and wait for the user to unlock the secure enclave later.
- DenisM 7y agoThank you!
- NightMKoder 7y agoI would be interested to know what the impact on Secure Enclave will be from this exploit. From quick googling it sounds like bootrom isn’t involved in booting SEP. One large change from the exploit though is unlocking isn’t required to jailbreak. Aside from that though - are there any extra abilities gained that weren’t already accessible as root (i.e. jailbreak) in iOS?
- monocasa 7y agoReplacing the kernel is the big one. On current hardware, once the kernel is loaded, the DRAM controller has its own memory protection unit seperate from the CPUs' MMUs that's set once and then can't be modified until the next reboot. This is used to enforce that the code segment of the kernel can't be written to even if you have access to physical memory or the page tables. It might make the secure enclave easier to hack, just by having a nicer, democratized access to application kernel space. But AFAIK none of this directly affects the secure enclave as it has its own bootrom that's way smaller and mainly just cryptographically verfies and executes a blob loaded by the main kernel.
- nudgeee 7y agoInteresting to see T8012 listed under future support, which is the T2 processor used on 2018+ MacBooks, iMac Pros and Mac Minis. T8002 is also listed under current support which is the T1 processor used in 2016 & 2017 MacBook Pros with Touch Bar.
- rickmark 7y agohttps://github.com/axi0mX/ipwndfu/issues/141 https://github.com/axi0mX/ipwndfu/issues/141 I've been poking at this already, and I'd venture a guess that the T2 will be breakable. The reason I think the XS and later are hard is pointer authentication codes, but that's more conjecture as I don't have a SecureROM dump from an XS. Plan to examine other parts of the boot-loader like iLLB, assuming they are not encrypted, for the ARM branch with authentication instructions...
- hnghost 7y agoGawd Dayum
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- hansdieter1337 7y agooh no, they found the NSA backdoor :(
- gao8a 7y agoWould something this calibre qualify for the $1M bug bounty?
- topranks 7y agoIt was already found by Apple and fixed in iPhone XS & 11, so not sure if it would qualify.
- alexlouis99 7y agoI have a question... I have an Iphone 7 Plus that I've been holding onto for awhile now that has an Icloud Lock (I bought it used and didn't set up the phone while I was there.. I know, stupid mistake) So will this exploit PERMANENTLY bypass the Icloud Lock once I install a new firmware etc. Or every time the phone shuts off / restarts I have to run the code once it gets developed in order to do this? That would really suck if that's the case.