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> It's not clear to me why any user of Mozilla would care about DNSSEC (which Mozilla doesn't support anyways). So you talk to Cloudflare via DoH: how do you k
by throw0101a 7y ago
> It's not clear to me why any user of Mozilla would care about DNSSEC (which Mozilla doesn't support anyways).
So you talk to Cloudflare via DoH: how do you know that CF isn't manipulating the results? (Perhaps by government coercion.)
> ... it's not at all clear why they'd actively want DoT, whose only real "benefit" over DoH is that it can be actively filtered by network providers who don't want users encrypting their DNS queries.
Mozilla may want to support it because it could prevent them from being banned from corporate environments that may need to monitor queries for regulatory reasons. It doesn't have to be the default, but being able to enable it via a GPO could be useful.
- tptacek 7y agoFirst, almost nobody signs their zones. DNSSEC has practically no meaningful adoption (lots of tiny zones in Europe are signed because their registrars do it automatically, but break zones down by usage and you'll see a very different story). But, more importantly, DNSSEC is a server-server protocol; it doesn't protect end-systems at all. If you're using any external resolver, the "SEC" part of DNSSEC is a single bit in the header saying "some other resolver checked signatures". You'd have to trust Cloud Flare either way.
- throw0101a 7y ago> But, more importantly, DNSSEC is a server-server protocol; it doesn't protect end-systems at all. RFC 4033 defines a validating stub resolver. Some mention of putting it in glibc: * https://lwn.net/Articles/664776/ https://lwn.net/Articles/664776/ I'm sure the systemD folks will get around to it. Still, as someone who works in IT, I'm happy to implement DoT/DoH internally--just don't go around overriding the settings I want my desktops to use. We're already noticing breakage in our testing due to split-horizon DNS and hairpin NAT.
- tptacek 7y agoIs there a stub resolver you're aware of that is in mainstream use anywhere that sets CD and does its own validation? My belief is that the answer is "no", but you might know better.
- wahern 7y agoWhat constitutes meaningful adoption? Deployment is 25% in the U.S., and nearly 50% in Germany. See https://stats.labs.apnic.net/dnssec https://stats.labs.apnic.net/dnssec More importantly, 91% of TLDs are signed. See http://stats.research.icann.org/dns/tld_report/ http://stats.research.icann.org/dns/tld_report/ Because only the most esoteric of domains lack DNSSEC at the TLD level, this means you can prevent your domain from being hijacked for anyone who cares by simply signing your own zone. Who would care to validate DNSSEC at 25% deployment? Providers of ridiculously centralized DoT and DoH DNS proxies, like Google and Cloudflare. > But, more importantly, DNSSEC is a server-server protocol; it doesn't protect end-systems at all. It's trivial for systems to run their own recursive DNS service locally, while also making use of intermediate caching nameservers. systemd supports this, for example, and OpenBSD almost shipped with a local resolver service that enforced DNSSEC by default (some last minute hiccups caused them to disable it before release). Chrome and Mozilla are shipping entire bespoke client DNS transports. Adding recursive resolution support with DNSSEC verification to their in-browser resolver is trivial by comparison. I've written a recursive DNS stub resolver, so know first hand. In fact, CNAME chaining requires client stub resolvers to already support recursive lookup logic as intermediate recursive, caching resolvers don't always include CNAME chains in their responses, especially for out-of-bailiwick chains or when chains can't be resolved from the local cache. Going from CNAME recursion to recursion on authorities is trivial. Likewise, DNSSEC verification is trivial compared to the nightmare that is TLS and X.509 certificate parsing and constraint checking.
- tptacek 7y agoThose numbers are based on random zones nobody cares about largely being auto-signed by registrars, which is security theater. Instead, look at popular/major sites, and count how many of them are signed. Look at sites run by actual security teams and note that virtually none of them except for Cloud Flare, which sells DNSSEC services, sign their zones. Obviously people can stop using DNS servers altogether and run recursive resolvers (and, of course, expose all their queries to their ISP, which is precisely the problem DoH is trying to solve). And, as you know, effectively nobody does this. Obviously, browsers can add support for DNSSEC. But they've done the opposite thing: they've piloted it --- at Apple, at Mozilla, and at Google --- and then later withdrew support. DNSSEC is a dead letter. It has no operational relevance today; the root keys could be Pastebinned and no site on the Internet would be compromised. And after 25 years of pointless effort, no meaningful adoption has occurred; rather, it has been un-adopted from the few places that tried.