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If Mozilla cares about privacy and consent, it'd be nice they would have also implemented DNS-over-TLS and let people choose what to use. Also, their idea of "
by throw0101a 7y ago
If Mozilla cares about privacy and consent, it'd be nice they would have also implemented DNS-over-TLS and let people choose what to use.
Also, their idea of "use-application-dns.net" is half-baked: it breaks DNSSEC because one has to override the responses from the .net folks--which are signed. One suggest I head (by the author of the linked article) was to use something like "use.application-dns.net" instead. So you are overriding the responses of a particular domain instead of a TLD.
Further, once you have 'access' to ".applicaiton-dns.net" there are other things that can be done:
* check for use-doh for DNS-over-HTTPS desirability
* check for use-dot for DNS-over-TLS desirability
It seems to me that Mozilla didn't bother talking to any DNS experts (e.g., DNS-OARC), and now everyone is scrambling.
Most people aren't against encrypted DNS, but it just needs to be implemented properly.
- tptacek 7y agoIt's not clear to me why any user of Mozilla would care about DNSSEC (which Mozilla doesn't support anyways). For that matter: while it's obvious why Mozilla users would want to choose which resolver they trust (Cloud Flare, or something else), it's not at all clear why they'd actively want DoT, whose only real "benefit" over DoH is that it can be actively filtered by network providers who don't want users encrypting their DNS queries.
- throw0101a 7y ago> It's not clear to me why any user of Mozilla would care about DNSSEC (which Mozilla doesn't support anyways). So you talk to Cloudflare via DoH: how do you know that CF isn't manipulating the results? (Perhaps by government coercion.) > ... it's not at all clear why they'd actively want DoT, whose only real "benefit" over DoH is that it can be actively filtered by network providers who don't want users encrypting their DNS queries. Mozilla may want to support it because it could prevent them from being banned from corporate environments that may need to monitor queries for regulatory reasons. It doesn't have to be the default, but being able to enable it via a GPO could be useful.
- tptacek 7y agoFirst, almost nobody signs their zones. DNSSEC has practically no meaningful adoption (lots of tiny zones in Europe are signed because their registrars do it automatically, but break zones down by usage and you'll see a very different story). But, more importantly, DNSSEC is a server-server protocol; it doesn't protect end-systems at all. If you're using any external resolver, the "SEC" part of DNSSEC is a single bit in the header saying "some other resolver checked signatures". You'd have to trust Cloud Flare either way.
- throw0101a 7y ago> But, more importantly, DNSSEC is a server-server protocol; it doesn't protect end-systems at all. RFC 4033 defines a validating stub resolver. Some mention of putting it in glibc: * https://lwn.net/Articles/664776/ https://lwn.net/Articles/664776/ I'm sure the systemD folks will get around to it. Still, as someone who works in IT, I'm happy to implement DoT/DoH internally--just don't go around overriding the settings I want my desktops to use. We're already noticing breakage in our testing due to split-horizon DNS and hairpin NAT.
- tptacek 7y agoIs there a stub resolver you're aware of that is in mainstream use anywhere that sets CD and does its own validation? My belief is that the answer is "no", but you might know better.
- wahern 7y agoWhat constitutes meaningful adoption? Deployment is 25% in the U.S., and nearly 50% in Germany. See https://stats.labs.apnic.net/dnssec https://stats.labs.apnic.net/dnssec More importantly, 91% of TLDs are signed. See http://stats.research.icann.org/dns/tld_report/ http://stats.research.icann.org/dns/tld_report/ Because only the most esoteric of domains lack DNSSEC at the TLD level, this means you can prevent your domain from being hijacked for anyone who cares by simply signing your own zone. Who would care to validate DNSSEC at 25% deployment? Providers of ridiculously centralized DoT and DoH DNS proxies, like Google and Cloudflare. > But, more importantly, DNSSEC is a server-server protocol; it doesn't protect end-systems at all. It's trivial for systems to run their own recursive DNS service locally, while also making use of intermediate caching nameservers. systemd supports this, for example, and OpenBSD almost shipped with a local resolver service that enforced DNSSEC by default (some last minute hiccups caused them to disable it before release). Chrome and Mozilla are shipping entire bespoke client DNS transports. Adding recursive resolution support with DNSSEC verification to their in-browser resolver is trivial by comparison. I've written a recursive DNS stub resolver, so know first hand. In fact, CNAME chaining requires client stub resolvers to already support recursive lookup logic as intermediate recursive, caching resolvers don't always include CNAME chains in their responses, especially for out-of-bailiwick chains or when chains can't be resolved from the local cache. Going from CNAME recursion to recursion on authorities is trivial. Likewise, DNSSEC verification is trivial compared to the nightmare that is TLS and X.509 certificate parsing and constraint checking.
- unionpivo 7y agoOn my network's (both home and work) I definitively want to block, any other DNS than the ones I set up. It was easy and effective way, to block sites, ads, and make sure that internal sites resolved correctly. Trying to play whack a mole with DOH servers blacklists, sounds like a loosing game. Not exactly sure what solution there will be. Because in combination with ESNI, you will essentially have to block whole cloud flare, if you just want to block a single site. And since a lot of ad networks use cloud flare ... This gives more power to individual clients (both good ones like firefox, and chrome and bad ones like malware, trackers, other crap), but takes away power from centrally managing your own network. I definitively see reasons on both sides, why this is good or bad. Sorry for tangential rant :)
- craftyguy 7y ago> If Mozilla cares about privacy and consent It's pretty clear they don't care about consent, since there is no opt-in to this. It's also questionable as to whether they care about privacy, by funneling ALL of their users' DNS through one for-profit company.