"This is despite the all-out oil price war that Saudi started in 2014 against U.S. shale producers to try to destroy the industry through low prices caused by f

"This is despite the all-out oil price war that Saudi started in 2014 against U.S. shale producers to try to destroy the industry through low prices caused by flooding the markets with oil. “If the Saudis had anything near 12 million barrels per day capacity, that would have been the time to pump it but all it managed was just under 10 [million bpd] with 10.5 [million bpd] managed for just one month over that two-year period [2014-2016 before Saudi reversed it strategy],” Would it have been the time to pump it? If the goal was just to impact US shale producers, why also undercut your own sales? The best strategy factoring in shale-targeting AND profits would be to pump just as much as to impact shale producers, but no more. Also, another angle as hinted at from conclusions, but not included: "Saudi Arabia ends up boosting the bank accounts of the very people that it thinks was behind the attacks on its own oil infrastructure, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps " but, counterpoint, if they pumped too much at that time, dropping prices against US interests, when the political climate was more favorable to Iran, trade talks could have further favored Iran as a counterbalance, if for no other reason than to 'keep the saudis in line'. i have no direct knowledge, but the analysis is quick to highlight some angles and not others.