> Start pushing for more validation from the payment providers so you can be sure that a payment is legit and once you have jumped though the hoops that a payme

> Start pushing for more validation from the payment providers so you can be sure that a payment is legit and once you have jumped though the hoops that a payment is legit the bank takes the hit for the fraud. Agreed. There are basically zero digital payment systems in the US that aren't a complete joke, and all of our institutions think the correct answer to that problem is to add more captchas. Imagine an alternate reality where we discovered that HTTP traffic was trivially monster-in-the-middled, and instead of moving to HTTPS, we all said, "well, we'll just do device fingerprinting to validate the request came from the right person." This is the current digital payment system. Instead of moving to 2FA for each purchase or overhauling ACH, or changing payments to be a push system instead of a pull system, our solution to credit card fraud is that: A) payments will take a long time to resolve, B) customers will be required to be vetted using invasive, privacy-incompatible tools that don't work particularly well, and C) whenever something goes wrong, the merchant will take the financial hit instead of the payment processor that let the fraud happen in the first place. So many of our payment/privacy/fraud problems boil down to the fact that we are putting band-aides on a fundamentally broken system.