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> You sitting at the computer will identify your experiences as those that "you" experience, not those of the computer you. Conversely s/physical you/digital yo
by AnIdiotOnTheNet 7y ago
> You sitting at the computer will identify your experiences as those that "you" experience, not those of the computer you. Conversely s/physical you/digital you. Both entities are you (had the same past experiences) and only one is (has the current experiences), at the same time. The one is because "you" is composed out of your experiences. If you can't experience it, well it is not really part of your identity.
Ah, but that only really works if our memory is perfect and continuous, which we know it isn't. If I get black-out drunk and do something, I might have no memory of it whatsoever. It is not part of my current experience even in memory form. That doesn't mean it was someone else who did that thing though, does it? This is not all that dissimilar from the computer copy example.
What I'm trying to show is that concept of self cannot be made concrete. Any definition you use will be an approximation based on a gut feeling of how things are as opposed to logical deduction. Right now, if I understand your reasoning, you're saying that having two entities existing simultaneously (in so far as such a word is applicable in a relativistic spacetime) with a completely identical memory are separate beings, but you do extend that definition to encompass beings who do not share temporal locality. But why not? A copy of me existing at the exact same moment as me is very much more objectively identical to me than my 10 year old self, but the latter case is considered to be the same person and the former is not. I haven't seen any explanation for why this should be the case, merely a description of how we feel it is the case. Which is the point really: self is not an objectively definable property, but rather a fluid construct of the mind.
- godelski 7y ago> Ah, but that only really works if our memory is perfect and continuous, It is statements like this that make me think you troll. This statement doesn't matter. Physical you and digital you aren't blackout drunk the entire time. At some point they should be forming memories. You're bringing in a contrarian point of view to prove your own. Which no one is arguing that self is hard to define. That's not the conversation going on here. > self is not an objectively definable property, but rather a fluid construct of the mind. Self can be defined and a fluid construct. Here's an easy way to think of self. You recognize that you are not the chair you are sitting on. That the chair is different from you. My cat recognizes this kind of self. Such things like that I am not her and that another person is neither me nor her (this is a different level of self recognition than the classic mirror test tests. This is as basic as it gets). The self is the instantaneous thing having the experiences.You do not see through your clones eyes. You DID see through the 10 year old's eyes though. It does not matter that recall isn't perfect, you still had the exact same experiences as that 10 year old, but you don't have the exact same experiences as the clone (you're not looking through your clone's eyes and experiencing from their body).
- AnIdiotOnTheNet 7y ago> It is statements like this that make me think you troll. I honestly cannot fathom why you can't see what I'm trying to say. If it sounds like I'm repeating myself it is only because I keep trying to find a way to phrase it such that my reasoning can be understood. > Self can be defined and a fluid construct. Here's an easy way to think of self. You recognize that you are not the chair you are sitting on. That the chair is different from you. My cat recognizes this kind of self. Yes. But that is because this is how the human mind conceptualizes 'self' in this instance. It draws other lines when necessary to fulfill the purpose it was evolved for. My children are 'self' in many circumstances, or my community, or my nation. Sometimes, even ideals. If that isn't true, then why would a rational mind be willing to die for these things? These lines are arbitrary, and drawn by the mind to aid in fulfilling a purpose. As far as the universe itself is concerned, there is no difference between me and the chair (and in fact even humans would struggle to draw a perfect molecular outline where the chair ends and I begin). > You DID see through the 10 year old's eyes though. It does not matter that recall isn't perfect, but you don't have the exact same experiences as the clone Even if I don't remember the event at all? That doesn't make sense. In what sense did I experience an event I have no recollection of? It may as well have happened to a different person. Not to mention that the child is not sharing large swaths of my experience. The clone actually shares significantly more experience with me than the child, yet one is considered the same being and the other isn't. I keep saying this to point out the inherent inconsistency of the how this line is drawn, not because it is not useful but to show that it is not objectively real. Here's a question for you: Should the digital copy be punished for crimes the physical one committed before the copy took place? After all, it does have the experience of committing that crime. It was, by your own reasoning, at the very instant of the copy, the same person that committed that crime. If it is now a different person, is it responsible for the actions of the physical being in the past? Originally this whole discussion started because someone claimed that the upload (not copy, in this case) might not be the same as the person it perfectly mimics. That is, even though it is indistinguishable from the original, it is somehow not the same. This is the kind of strange conclusion that is drawn from having a naive conception that self is not a fluid construct but rather a rigid objective reality. This is the flawed thinking I'm seeking to remedy.