4 ms·

Avoiding entire classes of escaping/parsing vulnerabilities.

• tomc1985 7y ago
  By burying them in the framework....
  • HelloNurse 7y ago
    Yes, exactly, just like database query processing in ORM systems and the like "buries" SQL injection countermeasures in a single place. It's a good thing.
    • TeMPOraL 7y ago
      There's abstraction confusion here, though. All SQL injection countermeasures and all it would take to protect the above CLI call is respecting the actual language you're using. That is, not gluing a query/command from strings. Starting a subprocess via shell is could in particular be solved by a simple API of the form of: system('yourapp', ['option1', {'option2' : 'something'}]); in your favourite language. Handling pipes and redirects gets more complex, but I see no prima facie reason why it couldn't look like this: pipe(system('yourapp', ['option1', {'option2' : 'something'}]), system('grep', ['n', 'i', 'foobar']), system('somethingelse', [], null, file("/dev/null")));
      • account42 7y ago
        This assumes the --option=value syntax which while a de-facto standard on Unix-like systems is unfortunately not supported by all programs. I agree that system() (in C and other langues that simply copied it) is a bad API. For shell escaping a command to start a process with a list of arguments would be enough, and even POSIX C has you covered there with vararg and array variants. [1] [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man3/posix_spawn.3.html http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man3/posix_spawn.3.html (or fork() + exec())