5 ms·
> Then this is equally true of you now and the you who first read that comment, isn't it? The difference here is that there are not two entities, one that read
by godelski 7y ago
> Then this is equally true of you now and the you who first read that comment, isn't it?
The difference here is that there are not two entities, one that read the comment and one that didn't. All beings that associate with me have that shared experience, frankly because as far as we can tell there's only a single being here (and no evidence to suggest otherwise). (The scenario I set above there is a being in the computer and a being outside)
That's the big difference. That's where we can pose the question "Which one is 'you'". We need multiple entities for this to become a valid question. For an instant, I think they both would be. But an instant more, they are different.
- AnIdiotOnTheNet 7y agoI don't think we're disagreeing per-se. It's merely a matter of perspective. Continuity and singularity are what you're leaning on for your definition, and I'm just rejecting that criteria as illusory because it is self-imposed and arbitrary. Certainly such distinctions are useful for legal or societal purposes, but those themselves are just constructs of the human mind, not the intrinsic nature of the universe.
- godelski 7y agoWe're talking about the same thing in two threads. Multiple entities matter. And I'll refer you to my other statement https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21044119 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21044119. Your username isn't giving me confidence that you aren't trolling.
- AnIdiotOnTheNet 7y agoI'm not sure why you think I'm trolling. I'm certainly disagreeing that "multiple entities" is somehow a firm metric for determining "self". That doesn't even stand up in non-hypotheticals. Why do people sacrifice themselves for their children, families, communities, or nations? However, trying to stick more closely to the thread of conversation so far: I'm saying conceptually there isn't any difference between a having multiple entities because they both exist in the immediate present and having multiple entities separated temporally, as you and your past self are. Concept of self is a matter of arbitrary line drawing when you get right down to it, though some lines are more advantageous in certain circumstances than others. If you read my comment history you'll see that I'm not a troll (though I am sometimes an ass). My account is named what it is as a reminder of what we all are in places like these and why we shouldn't take them so seriously.
- godelski 7y agoMultiple entities does matter, a lot. Let me try to explain better. Before we do the upload there is a clear distinction of who is "you". It is the person I am talking to right now. The person with all your past experiences and the person that moves forward through time having those unique experiences. I think we can agree on that. Now let's upload your brain to the computer. You still exist and there's another exact copy of you on the computer. In that first instance you both have the exact same history and shared experiences. The problem is moving forward. You sitting at the computer will identify your experiences as those that "you" experience, not those of the computer you. Conversely s/physical you/digital you. Both entities are you (had the same past experiences) and only one is (has the current experiences), at the same time. The one is because "you" is composed out of your experiences. If you can't experience it, well it is not really part of your identity. One you can look at the other you on the computer monitor. We have distinct and unique experiences now. It is also clear that nothing has happened to the physical you. The physical "you" will clearly not identify the digital "you" as "self", because it is outside yourself (your experiences). It may be hard to define what "you" is, but it is clear that "you" has to have the experiences that are being processed. Key point: The two entities have different experiences and identify the other entity as a consciousness that they do not share current experiences with. We can take this to the single entity case, but that becomes convoluted in that there's a distinction of transferring your consciousness vs copying it. We may talk past one another in this case because it isn't clear if I'm imagining transfer and you're imagining copying, or vise versa. The two entity problem makes clear the distinction of "you" that is before the upload and you after the upload. I think it is clear that you can't have two "you"s (because they are different entities!).
- AnIdiotOnTheNet 7y ago> You sitting at the computer will identify your experiences as those that "you" experience, not those of the computer you. Conversely s/physical you/digital you. Both entities are you (had the same past experiences) and only one is (has the current experiences), at the same time. The one is because "you" is composed out of your experiences. If you can't experience it, well it is not really part of your identity. Ah, but that only really works if our memory is perfect and continuous, which we know it isn't. If I get black-out drunk and do something, I might have no memory of it whatsoever. It is not part of my current experience even in memory form. That doesn't mean it was someone else who did that thing though, does it? This is not all that dissimilar from the computer copy example. What I'm trying to show is that concept of self cannot be made concrete. Any definition you use will be an approximation based on a gut feeling of how things are as opposed to logical deduction. Right now, if I understand your reasoning, you're saying that having two entities existing simultaneously (in so far as such a word is applicable in a relativistic spacetime) with a completely identical memory are separate beings, but you do extend that definition to encompass beings who do not share temporal locality. But why not? A copy of me existing at the exact same moment as me is very much more objectively identical to me than my 10 year old self, but the latter case is considered to be the same person and the former is not. I haven't seen any explanation for why this should be the case, merely a description of how we feel it is the case. Which is the point really: self is not an objectively definable property, but rather a fluid construct of the mind.