3 ms·
My favorite is "locking the account after x number of password attempts". Ever want to annoy the hell out of someone? Try their username or email a bunch of ti
by exabrial 7y ago
My favorite is "locking the account after x number of password attempts".
Ever want to annoy the hell out of someone? Try their username or email a bunch of times and lock them out of their accounts. Bonus points if it's one of those super duper ultra secure banks that does password resets via snail mail.
/s [I don't condone doxing anyone. My point is that an attacker should not be able to modify the state of a system he's unauthorized to access]
- SamBam 7y agoThat seems to be the least objectionable to me. You need to have some protection against brute-forcing. Whether it's limiting the rate of guessing or whatever, the attacker is still "modifying the state of a system." Indeed, that's a weird rule. When someone stole my credit card number and ran up charges, my bank called me to verify them. How was that not "modifying the state of a system?"
- nybble41 7y ago> You need to have some protection against brute-forcing. Whether it's limiting the rate of guessing or whatever, the attacker is still "modifying the state of a system." You could just make brute-force searches unproductive, for example by requiring a hardware security key or client certificate rather than a mere password or PIN. Good luck brute-forcing a 128+-bit random secret. > When someone stole my credit card number and ran up charges, my bank called me to verify them. How was that not "modifying the state of a system?" The state of the system was modified when an unauthenticated (never mind unauthorized) individual managed to run up charges on your account using only your credit-card number—which is "sensitive" information but not actually secret. That should not have been permitted in the first place. If the rule had been applied properly then this remedial step would not have been necessary.
- zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 7y ago> You need to have some protection against brute-forcing. Yes, that protection is called "password". > Whether it's limiting the rate of guessing or whatever, the attacker is still "modifying the state of a system." Which is why you should not limit the rate of guessing (or at least offer that option--limiting the rate of guessing does help users who use terrible passwords, after all). > Indeed, that's a weird rule. When someone stole my credit card number and ran up charges, my bank called me to verify them. How was that not "modifying the state of a system?" Which is exactly why that shouldn't be a thing. Being able to pay with a semi-public number is just stupid. You should have to authenticate using a strong password, and "stealing credit card numbers" simply wouldn't be a thing anymore.
- SamBam 7y ago> Yes, that protection is called "password". [...] Which is why you should not limit the rate of guessing Any password can be brute-forced if you neither limit the number of guesses nor limit the rate that you can guess them.
- zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC 7y agoNo, it can't. If you are willing to say that a cow can not jump over the moon, then a strong password can not be brute-forced, even though it might theoretically be possible for a cow to quantum-tunnel over the moon, and it might theoretically be possible that an attacker guesses your password. The probability is so vanishingly small that you would call it impossible in any other context.
- exabrial 7y agoCredit card numbers are a great example of an attacker being able to modify the state of a system. The whole implementation is broken beyond belief. Why doesn't a purchase require a password, at the very minimum?
- darkhelmet 7y agoWe had a situation like this at work. My username was very common and got locked on our ssh proxies like clockwork with just the routine background internet scanning. I couldn't get any traction with getting this fixed. We had hardware 2FA (physical tokens), so brute forcing was effectively moot. Then, strangely, various senior folks found their accounts getting locked 1-2 times a day, including the founder. That autolock policy died in a week, and they started looking for 2FA failures instead, as they should have. I had considered "accidentally" setting up a ssh loop to do this but never quite got around to it. I assume somebody else did. I doubt that an infusion of sanity happened by accident.
- drblast 7y agoI did that to an overzealous sysadmin who wouldn't see the light about why a 30 minute password lock policy after three failed interactive tries with horrendous complexity requirements was a bad idea. Typed in his email address in front of him, hit enter three times, locked him out. Since this was a military base, typed in the commanding officer's email address, started to do the same thing, and suddenly the sysadmin saw the light shine down from heaven.