>It'd be more sensible to say that I am, therefore I have the possibility of thought, and the possibility of using thought to identify my own being. Would it b

>It'd be more sensible to say that I am, therefore I have the possibility of thought, and the possibility of using thought to identify my own being. Would it be? You're already positing that "I am" which there isn't a reason to believe if you were deceived about everything your senses tell you. At best, to start with "I am" simply re-raises the common objection to the cogito which is that Descartes assumes the "I" to begin with. It doesn't get you out of that bind. Nevertheless, there are contemporary defenses of the cogito, e.g. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41501714?seq=1 https://www.jstor.org/stable/41501714?seq=1