3 ms·
The most secure alternative, which should be the choice for anyone who actually cares, and an option anywhere that thinks _any_ of their users might care is Web
by tialaramex 7y ago
The most secure alternative, which should be the choice for anyone who actually cares, and an option anywhere that thinks _any_ of their users might care is WebAuthn (U2F is roughly the same thing but obsolete, no reason to deploy more of it)
WebAuthn uses FIDO Security keys, relatively cheap USB or Bluetooth devices or sometimes just a built-in feature of a smartphone, to authenticate. They are Something-You-Have, but the WebAuthn protocol also offers:
* Optionally a mode where you give the FIDO key a PIN (Something-You-Know) or biometric input (Something-You-Are) to do all the authentication locally
* Phishing proof - there's no decision about whether this is really your bank. WebAuthn is completely happy to log you into https://fake.bank.phishingsite.example/ https://fake.bank.phishingsite.example/ but the credentials are useless to the crooks who own that site because they won't work on https://your.actual.bank.example/ https://your.actual.bank.example/ even if the crooks got the logo just exactly right and wrote a very convincing pleading email from your bank saying they definitely need you to go to the fake bank site.
- Slimbo 7y agoWith all of these, you're often kicking the vulnerability down to the enrollment step. You've still got to find a way of assigning the authentication device/key generator to the users account in a secure way and dealing with losing the device.