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But then, what exactly was won? Seems to me, the request to api.creditmerchant.net is still a mostly ordinary cross-site requests, except the packets are routed
by xg15 7y ago
But then, what exactly was won? Seems to me, the request to api.creditmerchant.net is still a mostly ordinary cross-site requests, except the packets are routed through example.com - but example.com can't do anything with the packets, because they are encrypted.
So api.creditmerchant.net could still inject all kinds of malicious or buggy scripts and example.com can't do anything about it.
The one difference I see is that api.creditmerchant.net could restrict it's endpoints to only accept packets from example.com addresses - as they should never be called directly from a browser. This sounds like some ad-hoc CSRF protection. Was that the intention?
- birdyrooster 7y agoYes I think that was the intention. You reduce the attack surface for injection attacks because the injected code must route all requests through example.com. Example.com will implicitly trust api.creditmerchant.net as it does today, but that dependency once loaded won’t be able to make requests to untrusted resources categorically because it must route thru example.com. It seems like a spoiler for chaining attacks.