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Anyone that's expecting Apple to annually refresh their statements about this under oath to not be considered compromised is probably acting in bad faith. The

Anyone that's expecting Apple to annually refresh their statements about this under oath to not be considered compromised is probably acting in bad faith. The first time was good enough for anyone that actually wants to know if Apple had to make compromises to be in China. The answer is no and the reason why is obvious, Apple has some leverage in being a major employer and a highly visible American company operating in China. Apple's press statements as well as that on-the-record interview with the CEO are perfectly consistent with the court filings. >Originally, iCloud data was stored on Apple-controlled servers, with the Cupertino company holding the encryption keys. Apple announced a year ago that this would change to comply with new laws in China, and that data for Chinese iCloud accounts would be moved to a server run by Guizhou-Cloud Big Data (GCBD), a company owned by the provincial government. >However, I have spoken to Apple today, who confirmed that it still holds the encryption keys, and states categorically that they have not been made available to either GCBD or China Telecom. https://9to5mac.com/2018/07/18/chinese-icloud-data-china-telecom/ https://9to5mac.com/2018/07/18/chinese-icloud-data-china-tel... And the use of mutliple zero day exploits to target the Uyghurs basically confirms that China doesn't have direct, backdoor access to Apple products.

lern_too_spel 7y ago
> And the use of mutliple zero day exploits to target the Uyghurs basically confirms that China doesn't have direct, backdoor access to Apple products. Nobody claimed that the Chinese government has backdoor access to the phones themselves. They do have complete access to Chinese users' iCloud and iMessage data.
vatueil 7y ago
Doesn't it also paint an incomplete picture to present Apple's reassurances as backed by penalty of perjury when the most significant developments took place long after those statements in question? The fact that the iCloud China controversy happened years after those court filings was not disclosed in the original comment. The concerns expressed by human rights groups such as Amnesty International are nothing so blatant as a direct backdoor, but the erosion of layers of protection that extend beyond technical measures. As the previously cited report notes: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/02/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-apple-in-china/ https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/02/5-things-you-... > Apple says it has control over encryption keys and that it won't allow backdoors. Won't that protect users in China? > It all depends on the circumstances under which the company will allow GCBD – and the Chinese authorities – access to intelligible decrypted data on iCloud users. When users accept [the terms of service for iCloud in China](https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/icloud/en/gcbd-terms.html https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/icloud/en/gcbd...), they agree to allow their information and content to be turned over to law enforcement “if legally required to do so”. Significantly, from now on Apple will store the encryption keys for Chinese users in China, not in the US – making it all but inevitable that the company will be forced to hand over decrypted data so long as the request complies with Chinese law. > Given that many provisions of Chinese law offer inadequate protection to privacy, freedom of expression and other rights, simply checking whether government information requests comply with Chinese law doesn’t address whether complying with the request might contribute to human rights violations. Apple hasn’t confirmed whether or how it will assess whether government information requests might violate users’ human rights. We won't really know how Apple will respond until it's put to the test, and unfortunately that’s probably just a matter of time. > As for “backdoors”, or technical measures that would allow law enforcement or other government agencies to access unencrypted user data without having to ask for it, Apple’s commitment to prevent their use is admirable. But the commitment is meaningless if law enforcement can get the companies to decrypt user information simply by saying that it is for a criminal investigation.

lern_too_spel 7y ago

> And the use of mutliple zero day exploits to target the Uyghurs basically confirms that China doesn't have direct, backdoor access to Apple products. Nobody claimed that the Chinese government has backdoor access to the phones themselves. They do have complete access to Chinese users' iCloud and iMessage data.

vatueil 7y ago

Doesn't it also paint an incomplete picture to present Apple's reassurances as backed by penalty of perjury when the most significant developments took place long after those statements in question? The fact that the iCloud China controversy happened years after those court filings was not disclosed in the original comment. The concerns expressed by human rights groups such as Amnesty International are nothing so blatant as a direct backdoor, but the erosion of layers of protection that extend beyond technical measures. As the previously cited report notes: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/02/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-apple-in-china/ https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/02/5-things-you-... > Apple says it has control over encryption keys and that it won't allow backdoors. Won't that protect users in China? > It all depends on the circumstances under which the company will allow GCBD – and the Chinese authorities – access to intelligible decrypted data on iCloud users. When users accept [the terms of service for iCloud in China](https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/icloud/en/gcbd-terms.html https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/icloud/en/gcbd...), they agree to allow their information and content to be turned over to law enforcement “if legally required to do so”. Significantly, from now on Apple will store the encryption keys for Chinese users in China, not in the US – making it all but inevitable that the company will be forced to hand over decrypted data so long as the request complies with Chinese law. > Given that many provisions of Chinese law offer inadequate protection to privacy, freedom of expression and other rights, simply checking whether government information requests comply with Chinese law doesn’t address whether complying with the request might contribute to human rights violations. Apple hasn’t confirmed whether or how it will assess whether government information requests might violate users’ human rights. We won't really know how Apple will respond until it's put to the test, and unfortunately that’s probably just a matter of time. > As for “backdoors”, or technical measures that would allow law enforcement or other government agencies to access unencrypted user data without having to ask for it, Apple’s commitment to prevent their use is admirable. But the commitment is meaningless if law enforcement can get the companies to decrypt user information simply by saying that it is for a criminal investigation.