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I think the underlying issue is absolutely a power struggle. Until recently, the general understanding was that each network operator was responsible for the c
by xg15 7y ago
I think the underlying issue is absolutely a power struggle.
Until recently, the general understanding was that each network operator was responsible for the clients inside their network - and therefore also had the ability to set the network's configuration.
In 99.99% of the cases, this included access to nonlocal sites on other, public network's, aka "the web", but this was nowhere technically required. Browsers and other DNS-consuming apps were perfectly capable of working within other networks. What a DNS name resolved to was technically a property of the network.
By now, this model is shifted towards the Web as a platform with browsers and DNS as clear parts of it - a platform that is incidentally pay-to-play and centrally controlled by the US because at the very least you need recurring payments for your domain and you need to give companies and institutions located in the US control over your machine.
This shift has been going on for a long time, but I believe HTTPS-everywhere and DoH have served to make this unignorably obvious because those bring the concept of the web platform into the technology stack itself.
To make the tired old car analogy again: In the vast majority of cases, you will drive your car on the public road network and nowhere else. However your car is technically capable of driving off-road or performing highly questionable maneuvers in your backyard because the car itself doesn't have any concept of "public roads", "private roads" or "non-roads". DoH would be adding a device that turns off the engine as soon as you're not on a public road. What exactly constitutes as a "public road" is determined by the car manufacturer.
I do agree that in the long run it might be better for ensuring that "the web" is the same no matter from where you visit, but I think it's definitely more than a simple technical change.
I also think all the heuristics, opt-outs and special rules for corporate network's don't cut it, because they relegate the current default case to an uncommon special case - and developers have a habit of ignoring uncommon special cases. I wouldn't be surprised if we see a lot of non-browser apps and devices in the future that use DoH by default and that an administrator would have to reconfigure by hand for each single installation - or that are simply hardwired to some set of DoH servers without any way to configure them at all.
- s_tec 7y agoWow, I had not considered the deeper power shifts from this perspective. The root the problem, I suppose, lies with public-key cryptography. We all know encryption is a good thing (unless you want to broadcast private information to the world), but encryption is useless unless you know who you are talking to. When someone comes to you in a ski mask and says, "It's me, your best friend", you probably want to see their face before you tell them any secrets - they could be anybody. Online, though, how do we know who anybody is? The current answer, for better or worse, is TLS with pay-to-play domain registration and certificate authorities. Decentralized, peer-to-peer systems like PGP have never been easy for consumers to use. You can "off-road" encrypted DNS by running your own DoH server & installing self-signed certificates on your client devices, but that's not an easy option. "My LAN is my castle" may work for some cases, but most of us conduct business with people all over the world, thanks to the internet. This is the primary use-case for most networks & computer systems. I'm afraid individuals will continue losing the power struggle as long as decentralized identity systems remain obscure. We need something that's as easy and compelling to use as our current centralized systems. It needs to be something consumers can use it to secure their every-day communications, as easy as visiting an HTTPS web site or chatting with a friend on Facebook. I just don't know how we get from here to there.
- throw0101a 7y ago> ... but encryption is useless unless you know who you are talking to. False. Opportunistic encryption is useful even if you don't know the other person's identity. This is because it helps prevent wholesale surveillance and "tapping glass": * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM_(surveillance_program) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM_(surveillance_program) For the majority of the website I go to on a casual basis, I don't really care who is behind running them. Certainly I want that for my banks and webmail, but not so much for some random weblog that has an article comparing Rust and C. I'm all for Let's Encrypt, and pushed for it to be introduced at work (both for internal and external sites), but we could have gotten encryption in more places, a lot sooner if connections over plaint-HTTP (tcp/80) could have been upgraded automatically to encryption: * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/1.1_Upgrade_header https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP/1.1_Upgrade_header There would have been no lock icon in web browsers, but it would have scrambled a lot of bits. Yes, MITM would still have been possible, but MITM is a targeted attack that takes way more resources than simply vacuuming up everything that goes across the wire. The insistence of providing identity, IMHO, delayed the securing (or at least 'confidentializing') of communications by many years. LE/ACME is getting us there, but we could have had a lot more encrypted traffic already but for the desire for the little lock icon.
- StavrosK 7y agoSorry, I don't understand why this is. Can you not just set up your own DoH server, or use your ISP's (perhaps automatically via DHCP)? How is that different from what happens now, except the traffic is now encrypted?
- xg15 7y agoTo my knowledge, one of the defining characteristics of DoH is that it's not configured by the network. There is a default setting managed by Mozilla which the vast majority of users are expected to use (currently Cloudflare's resolver). You can choose to disable DoH or set your own resolver - however that has to be done manually for every installation of Firefox. Mozilla is offering a way for networks to signal "don't use DoH here" as described in this article, but Mozilla is intending this to be used for certain specific scenarios only (parental controls and corporate networks) and reserves the right to ignore the signal if it is misused. To my knowledge, there is no "DoH" entry in DHCP, where a network could specify a local DoH resolver. All articles I've read about it also very much treat it like an application-level protocol, as opposed to the old mechanism where resolution was done centrally by the OS. If this approach is continued, then every application would have to decide for itself which resolver it uses.
- StavrosK 7y agoIs this by design/intention, or just because DoH hasn't caught on yet so Mozilla is setting a sane default here? I can see how it would be a drawback if the network administrator had no way to configure the setting for all clients.
- Spivak 7y agoThe network administrator shouldn’t be able to change any setting at all on client devices. That’s the point! If you can just direct clients to a malicious DoH server then the project has largely failed. The device administrator should be the one making the choice about what resolvers to use.
- 7y ago
- throw0101a 7y ago> I do agree that in the long run it might be better for ensuring that "the web" is the same no matter from where you visit, but I think it's definitely more than a simple technical change. Tell that to the health and financial regulatory regimes that us some of have to work under to ensure people's privacy is respected. I work in health care, and we have data-at-rest and -in-motion encryption and firewalls and application-level ACLs & permissions all over the place in our internal network. Not being able to resolve internal-only systems, which have absolutely no need/business being in external DNS, because of a change in behaviour in client software is just dumb. People complain about the stupidity of (e.g.) power plant controls being directly connected to the Internet, or not being air gapped from the folks in Accounting, but then we seem to have developers writing software that will not work very well in these isolated/island networks. I'm all for the general end-to-end principal (that IPv6 may help bring back) with protection being done by stateful firewalls, but there are all sorts of use cases for private, isolated networks that are behind NAT/NPT gateways that are given ULA addresses.