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What I still don't see addressed is the question how this will affect non-browser applications. It's nice that Firefox (currently) still offers options to turn
by xg15 7y ago
What I still don't see addressed is the question how this will affect non-browser applications.
It's nice that Firefox (currently) still offers options to turn off DoH and to keep using local domains. (although the way DoH and HTTPS-everywhere are structured show that non-internet sites don't seem to have much of a place in the web of the future)
However, now that we have public DoH endpoints available for everyone to query, what will keep non-browser apps and devices from using DoH without any way to opt-out?
Currently, tracking DNS requests seems to be a common way for security and privacy researchers to get some basic information what an app or device is doing on the internet. If DoH is widely deployed, all you'll probably be seeing is encrypted connections to IPs of shared hosters.
This seems like a perfect opportunity for apps and devices to cloak data tracking and other illegitimate requests.
- zamadatix 7y agoThe same thing that stopped it before DoH was standardized: nothing. There are ways to make FW rules based on trusted DNS lookups (i.e. you can only do traditional DNS to a trusted DNS server with domain filtering and you can only connect to an IP if a DNS lookup has been performed) but this is extremely hard to maintain in any sort of foolproof way. The truth is if you allow outbound connectivity then there all the sender needs to do is add 1 more level of obfuscation than you secure against.