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> But the theory posits internal mechanisms, and nobody has determined a reliable to measure this yet That's the generalized problem with psychoanalysis. It ri
by thanatropism 7y ago
> But the theory posits internal mechanisms, and nobody has determined a reliable to measure this yet
That's the generalized problem with psychoanalysis. It rings true, but lies outside Popperian lines. It's not science in the contemporary sense.
Then again, psychology within Popperian lines isn't doing so great. My hot take is that modern psychology's problem is not about overemphasizing biology or anything like that -- it's that it tries to be "enhanced behaviorism": start from what's most superficial and apparent and try to find e.g. what's the molecule of love or the rational (cognitive therapy) way of dealing with depression. Physics got where it is by postulating general principles (e.g. conservation of energy) from shreds of evidence.
To do this with psychology takes you outside Popperian lines.
- qubex 7y agoI think your use of ‘problem’ subtends a subtle bias. We tend to take ‘science’ as the golden standard of knowledge, and I’m all for that, but when dealing with human cognitiuon it kind of breaks down anyway because we find ourselves dealing with qualia sooner or later anyway. Expecting falsifiability at the basis of the the cognitive pyramid is, at least for the foreseeable non-cyberpunk future, a bit of a stretch.
- thanatropism 7y agoMy recent comment history has some gushing about Lacan. I might be a fool but I'm not that scientistic strawman.
- dredmorbius 7y agoIn the case of qualia, whilst we cannot make direct measurements, we can make indirect measurements, most especially of behaviour in response to some stimulus or phenomenon. Though that can also go poorly. Microeconomics is based on the foundation of the qualia of utility, as an example. Which presents numerous problems.