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So let me get this straight. The author is saying that his answer to the the classic hypothetical dilemma in ethics of "is it right to do harm (murder one) to

So let me get this straight. The author is saying that his answer to the the classic hypothetical dilemma in ethics of "is it right to do harm (murder one) to prevent a greater harm (death of five)" which usually framed in utilitarian-ish debates is: a hypothetical incorruptible super awesome version of me would murder the innocent person but as I am not that type of being (and only that type of being can answer the question) I am not going to answer the question But why not go all in and pose it thus: "is it better for one person to suffer eternal suffering to free all others from any type of suffering"? And that's why Jesus died for our sins you know. And that really happened. And Jesus was smarter than a hypothetical incorruptible super awesome version of you. Therefore ... I'm not sure where this is going. Maybe what I'm trying to say is (and by all means argue the toss with me and don't shoot me down) Eliezer Yudkowsky sounds a lot smarter than he actually is.

secret 16y ago
There's a difference between sacrificing another and sacrificing yourself.
- igravious 16y ago
  May we never be placed in that position ever in our lives.
deleted 16y ago
[deleted]
jerf 16y ago
That is not an adequate summary of the point. The point that you are addressing is that if we are to truly take this as a question about "what should a real person do?", the question can be rephrased without loss as "You are a person standing before the track and you know with 100% certainty that if you flip the switch that one person is 100% likely to die and if you do nothing that five people are 100% likely to die." and his response is that it isn't even possible in theory for a person to know these things with 100% certainty. The key phrase is "I can't occupy the epistemological state you want me to imagine". I would also draw your attention to the first sentence of the next paragraph: "Now, to me this seems like a dodge." This isn't the core point of the essay, and the more I stare at it, the more it does seem like it's five paragraphs accidentally ripped from another essay ("And now the philosopher comes" -> "Now to me this seems like a dodge"); if you just cut those five out entirely it seems more focused, and those five paragraphs can spin off into another interesting essay. (One that would, I think, conclude that this is actually just a way of rephrasing the idea that philosophical hypotheticals are actually useless by virtue of being impossibly overspecified which itself comes from impossible oversimplification, and in general the hypothetical question "What if an absolutely mathematically impossible thing happened?" is not a fruitful line of thought.)
- igravious 16y ago
  Great response. I did not highlight the distinction that in this class of hypotheticals that the lesser harm requires action and that the greater harm requires one to simply do nothing, to stand idly by as it were - oh my god, I can here the voice of my prof in my head from days gone by as I clarify this point. Still, the causal link remains, one can either choose to act or not (or insist that you cannot even begin to play the game as was done here). But apart from that action/inaction subtlety I have to disagree with you here, it is an accurate if not entirely straight-faced summary. Look, you might have a good working understanding of "can't occupy the epistemological state" (oh really, why? because I haven't achieved the level of perfection of my future hypothetical self) but I find it fairly meaningless. Hint: substitue epistemological with ethical or even aesthetical to see if such an assertion becomes any more meaningful. Note: I am not saying that I am positioning myself against the "you can't even begin to play (or, I'm not playing) the game" stance or some variation thereof as my response to this dilemma would be probably something along these lines given my aversion to hypothetical thought experiments such as this which I feel contribute very little to the debates in morality and ethics. This isn't the core point of the essay. But this is not the case surely. The essay makes many points, sure, but this chain of reasoning is I believe fairly central and although it could be excised I believe that the author formulated the whole essay this way for a reason. This post-singularity being's properties are analysed in the light of a very classic problem in philosophy. If you look at the comments you will see that a poster points out that "regular" philosophers invoke mythical beings such as 'angels' or 'ideally rational agents' which are non-tech versions of what is going on here. I don't think it's a dodge, it doesn't even seem like a dodge and the author didn't even need to point this out. Where I'm coming from is that this ground has been covered and it has been covered in language that is not obfuscated. The jargon salad does nothing more than communicate "look at me, I'm so clever" which is why I claim that the author sounds smarter than he actually is. just a way of rephrasing the idea that philosophical hypotheticals are actually useless by virtue of being impossibly overspecified which itself comes from impossible oversimplification This would be something a logical positivist would say. It's something I'm very inclined towards. I agree that hypotheticals like this generate a good amount of noise and heat but they fail to be constructive or advance our understanding of ethical questions beyond perhaps showing what ethical norms a person subscribes to, to whit: all life is sacred and one is commanded by a supreme being to do no harm, all life has intrinsic worth/value so you shall never through action do harm, you shall optimize for the greater good, and so on and so on.
sp332 16y ago
Did you miss the bit where Jesus asserted power over death and came back to life after three days? The sacrifice was a blood sacrifice, not a soul sacrifice. Eternal suffering doesn't come into it.
- yters 16y ago
  Theologically Jesus is to have suffered all that humans can suffer. So, even though He resurrected in 3 days, that doesn't mean He couldn't have experienced an eternity of torment. By His own account, He experienced complete abandonment by God.
  - sp332 16y ago
    It said he was tested (tempted) in all ways. Hell isn't a test or temptation, I don't think it counts.
  - deleted 16y ago
    [deleted]
- igravious 16y ago
  Haha. No, I didn't miss that bit. I had it pretty well drummed into me as a kid in good old catholic Ireland. I'm no theologian but I was told he died for our sins which was awfully nice of him. I'm sure everything was roses post-mortem. I was merely bringing the thought experiment to its logical utilitarian conclusion and showing that in doing so it has some mythical/biblical/primordial resonances.
JoachimSchipper 16y ago
Eliezer's answer seems to be "do no harm, even when this seems to be beneficial, as your judgment is likely to be wrong". For instance, quite a few dictators seize power and suppress dissent because they honestly believe that's the best for the people. It's all too easy to convince oneself that something that is convenient for oneself but harmful to another is, ultimately, "for the greater good". Of course, exceptions to the "do no harm" rule do exist. However, the probability of the current case being an exception may be vanishingly small, even if you are convinced it is an exception. If this probability is indeed very small, the "do no harm" rule produces a better expected outcome than a "pragmatic/utilitarian" point of view for a human (imperfect) agent. In the philosopher's "100% sure" case, a true mathematical weighting can be made and (true) utilitarism wins; but no human can ever be that sure.

secret 16y ago

There's a difference between sacrificing another and sacrificing yourself.

igravious 16y ago
May we never be placed in that position ever in our lives.

deleted 16y ago

[deleted]

jerf 16y ago

That is not an adequate summary of the point. The point that you are addressing is that if we are to truly take this as a question about "what should a real person do?", the question can be rephrased without loss as "You are a person standing before the track and you know with 100% certainty that if you flip the switch that one person is 100% likely to die and if you do nothing that five people are 100% likely to die." and his response is that it isn't even possible in theory for a person to know these things with 100% certainty. The key phrase is "I can't occupy the epistemological state you want me to imagine". I would also draw your attention to the first sentence of the next paragraph: "Now, to me this seems like a dodge." This isn't the core point of the essay, and the more I stare at it, the more it does seem like it's five paragraphs accidentally ripped from another essay ("And now the philosopher comes" -> "Now to me this seems like a dodge"); if you just cut those five out entirely it seems more focused, and those five paragraphs can spin off into another interesting essay. (One that would, I think, conclude that this is actually just a way of rephrasing the idea that philosophical hypotheticals are actually useless by virtue of being impossibly overspecified which itself comes from impossible oversimplification, and in general the hypothetical question "What if an absolutely mathematically impossible thing happened?" is not a fruitful line of thought.)

igravious 16y ago
Great response. I did not highlight the distinction that in this class of hypotheticals that the lesser harm requires action and that the greater harm requires one to simply do nothing, to stand idly by as it were - oh my god, I can here the voice of my prof in my head from days gone by as I clarify this point. Still, the causal link remains, one can either choose to act or not (or insist that you cannot even begin to play the game as was done here). But apart from that action/inaction subtlety I have to disagree with you here, it is an accurate if not entirely straight-faced summary. Look, you might have a good working understanding of "can't occupy the epistemological state" (oh really, why? because I haven't achieved the level of perfection of my future hypothetical self) but I find it fairly meaningless. Hint: substitue epistemological with ethical or even aesthetical to see if such an assertion becomes any more meaningful. Note: I am not saying that I am positioning myself against the "you can't even begin to play (or, I'm not playing) the game" stance or some variation thereof as my response to this dilemma would be probably something along these lines given my aversion to hypothetical thought experiments such as this which I feel contribute very little to the debates in morality and ethics. This isn't the core point of the essay. But this is not the case surely. The essay makes many points, sure, but this chain of reasoning is I believe fairly central and although it could be excised I believe that the author formulated the whole essay this way for a reason. This post-singularity being's properties are analysed in the light of a very classic problem in philosophy. If you look at the comments you will see that a poster points out that "regular" philosophers invoke mythical beings such as 'angels' or 'ideally rational agents' which are non-tech versions of what is going on here. I don't think it's a dodge, it doesn't even seem like a dodge and the author didn't even need to point this out. Where I'm coming from is that this ground has been covered and it has been covered in language that is not obfuscated. The jargon salad does nothing more than communicate "look at me, I'm so clever" which is why I claim that the author sounds smarter than he actually is. just a way of rephrasing the idea that philosophical hypotheticals are actually useless by virtue of being impossibly overspecified which itself comes from impossible oversimplification This would be something a logical positivist would say. It's something I'm very inclined towards. I agree that hypotheticals like this generate a good amount of noise and heat but they fail to be constructive or advance our understanding of ethical questions beyond perhaps showing what ethical norms a person subscribes to, to whit: all life is sacred and one is commanded by a supreme being to do no harm, all life has intrinsic worth/value so you shall never through action do harm, you shall optimize for the greater good, and so on and so on.

sp332 16y ago

Did you miss the bit where Jesus asserted power over death and came back to life after three days? The sacrifice was a blood sacrifice, not a soul sacrifice. Eternal suffering doesn't come into it.

yters 16y ago
Theologically Jesus is to have suffered all that humans can suffer. So, even though He resurrected in 3 days, that doesn't mean He couldn't have experienced an eternity of torment. By His own account, He experienced complete abandonment by God.
- sp332 16y ago
  It said he was tested (tempted) in all ways. Hell isn't a test or temptation, I don't think it counts.
- deleted 16y ago
  [deleted]
igravious 16y ago
Haha. No, I didn't miss that bit. I had it pretty well drummed into me as a kid in good old catholic Ireland. I'm no theologian but I was told he died for our sins which was awfully nice of him. I'm sure everything was roses post-mortem. I was merely bringing the thought experiment to its logical utilitarian conclusion and showing that in doing so it has some mythical/biblical/primordial resonances.

JoachimSchipper 16y ago

Eliezer's answer seems to be "do no harm, even when this seems to be beneficial, as your judgment is likely to be wrong". For instance, quite a few dictators seize power and suppress dissent because they honestly believe that's the best for the people. It's all too easy to convince oneself that something that is convenient for oneself but harmful to another is, ultimately, "for the greater good". Of course, exceptions to the "do no harm" rule do exist. However, the probability of the current case being an exception may be vanishingly small, even if you are convinced it is an exception. If this probability is indeed very small, the "do no harm" rule produces a better expected outcome than a "pragmatic/utilitarian" point of view for a human (imperfect) agent. In the philosopher's "100% sure" case, a true mathematical weighting can be made and (true) utilitarism wins; but no human can ever be that sure.