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Full report: https://www.aspi.org.au/report/tweeting-through-great-firewall https://www.aspi.org.au/report/tweeting-through-great-firewa... >Researchers from

Full report: https://www.aspi.org.au/report/tweeting-through-great-firewall https://www.aspi.org.au/report/tweeting-through-great-firewa... >Researchers from the International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute have conducted a preliminary analysis of the dataset. Our research indicates that the information operation targeted at the protests appears to have been a relatively small and hastily assembled operation rather than a sophisticated information campaign planned well in advance. >However, our research has also found that the accounts included in the information operation identified by Twitter were active in earlier information operations targeting political opponents of the Chinese government, including an exiled billionaire, a human rights lawyer, a bookseller and protestors in mainland China. The earliest of these operations date back to April 2017. >This is significant because—if the attribution to state-backed actors made by Twitter is correct—it indicates that actors linked to the Chinese government may have been running covert information operations on Western social media platforms for at least two years. >Research limitations: ICPC does not have access to the relevant data to independently verify that these accounts are linked to the Chinese government; this research proceeds on the assumption that Twitter’s attribution is correct. It is also important to note that Twitter has not released the methodology by which this dataset was selected, and the dataset may not represent a complete picture of Chinese state-linked information operations on Twitter. Chinese foreign propaganda has been typically bad, but it's a little wild it's still this bad especially after two years. Almost makes attribution harder to believe.

b_tterc_p 7y ago
This jumped out at me too. It’s pretty garbage, but it may be that garbage works
- dirtyid 7y ago
  The data set relevant to HK comprised of 112 accounts and 1600 tweets, only significantly active during mid June to mid July before activity stopped. https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-09/chiTweet_HK_tweets_per_day.png https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-09/chiT...? Very anemic effort, but I think Twitter also proactively suspended 200,000 accounts as well. The operation probably pivoted following the crackdown. Still it's a little difficult reconciling how low effort this is with the Chinese influence everywhere narrative. >The ICPC’s preliminary research indicates that the information operation targeting the Hong Kong protests, as reflected in this dataset, was relatively small hastily constructed, and relatively unsophisticated. This suggests that the operation, which Twitter has identified as linked to state-backed actors, is likely to have been a rapid response to the unanticipated size and power of the Hong Kong protests rather than a campaign planned well in advance. The unsophisticated nature of the campaign suggests a crude understanding of information operations and rudimentary tradecraft that is a long way from the skill level demonstrated by other state actors. This may be because the campaigns were outsourced to a contractor, or may reflect a lack of familiarity on the part of Chinese state-backed actors when it comes to information operations on open social media platforms such as Twitter, as opposed to the highly proficient levels of control demonstrated by the Chinese government over heavily censored platforms such as WeChat or Weibo. I'm really curious how Twitter attributed the campaign was state backed, something Facebook and Google did not claim. Were these accounts transparently VPNing from the mainland or was there something more sophisticated happening.
dredmorbius 7y ago
Bad how? Extreme in degree or volume? Incompetent? Obvious?

b_tterc_p 7y ago

This jumped out at me too. It’s pretty garbage, but it may be that garbage works

dirtyid 7y ago
The data set relevant to HK comprised of 112 accounts and 1600 tweets, only significantly active during mid June to mid July before activity stopped. https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-09/chiTweet_HK_tweets_per_day.png https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-09/chiT...? Very anemic effort, but I think Twitter also proactively suspended 200,000 accounts as well. The operation probably pivoted following the crackdown. Still it's a little difficult reconciling how low effort this is with the Chinese influence everywhere narrative. >The ICPC’s preliminary research indicates that the information operation targeting the Hong Kong protests, as reflected in this dataset, was relatively small hastily constructed, and relatively unsophisticated. This suggests that the operation, which Twitter has identified as linked to state-backed actors, is likely to have been a rapid response to the unanticipated size and power of the Hong Kong protests rather than a campaign planned well in advance. The unsophisticated nature of the campaign suggests a crude understanding of information operations and rudimentary tradecraft that is a long way from the skill level demonstrated by other state actors. This may be because the campaigns were outsourced to a contractor, or may reflect a lack of familiarity on the part of Chinese state-backed actors when it comes to information operations on open social media platforms such as Twitter, as opposed to the highly proficient levels of control demonstrated by the Chinese government over heavily censored platforms such as WeChat or Weibo. I'm really curious how Twitter attributed the campaign was state backed, something Facebook and Google did not claim. Were these accounts transparently VPNing from the mainland or was there something more sophisticated happening.

dredmorbius 7y ago

Bad how? Extreme in degree or volume? Incompetent? Obvious?