In industry "secret sharing" has essentially become a good indicator for snakeoil. Virtually all applications people argue for the direct use of secret sharing

In industry "secret sharing" has essentially become a good indicator for snakeoil. Virtually all applications people argue for the direct use of secret sharing make limited sense under plausible threat models. The implementations are usually flawed, almost universally containing at least certificational issues like timing/emi channels (which are likely worse threats than the things they protect against in most cases) and it's not that uncommon to find implementations which are broken in ways that completely undermine their security. An intuitive way to understand why this is so is that secret sharing can be fairly seen as a generalization of one-time-pad encryption to support thesholds, and so the same (and worse) fragility that is widely understood to exist for OTP encryption exists for SSS. To be useful secret sharing needs to take place as part of a greater protocol-- and it does, but then it doesn't get called secret sharing-- it gets called whatever the greater thing is like "multiparty threshold signatures". Academic work on building blocks is useful, but its another thing to promote something as directly useful industrially.