3 ms·
It was my understanding that such redundancy for automation purposes did not even exist, and that despite having 2 AoA sensors only one was selected before a fl
by temac 7y ago
It was my understanding that such redundancy for automation purposes did not even exist, and that despite having 2 AoA sensors only one was selected before a flight, with the computer switching the one to be used between each flight.
Also Southwest certainly did not have all of the indicators at first, because they added some: https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/southwest-airlines-is-adding-new-angle-of-attack-indicators-to-its-737-max-fleet/ https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/southwest-airlines...
(note that pretty much nobody used that kind of indicator before, so I don't say that to put blame on Southwest)
It was also my understanding that some alarms including the AoA disagree were optional and for a fee even though probably activated by only needing to switch a bit somewhere in the software. So if Southwest had AoA disagree from the beginning (I don't know), well that's cool, but my interpretation is more like: that's not cool that some other airlines did not have it because of the dubious commercial practices of Boeing.
- privateSFacct 7y agoCorrect - limited / no redundancy tech side. The design redundancy was the pilot in the loop - ie, in a stab trim situation pilot would follow a memory item. So this meant much less automation protection compared to systems without pilot in loop.