If I'm understanding correctly, you seem to be criticizing negative failings rather than the much more dangerous and trust-dampening positive failings. I could

If I'm understanding correctly, you seem to be criticizing negative failings rather than the much more dangerous and trust-dampening positive failings. I could also name plenty of things beyond not anticipating the Soviet Union's; e.g. improper response to intelligence warning of a possible attack pre-9/11. I think failing to predict or be aware of something is very different from proactively claiming something which turns out to be false, as with the Iraq WMDs. The question that's being asked here is not how often intelligence agencies actually gets intelligence or gets or recognizes accurate intelligence, but how often an intelligence apparatus proactively provides a report or claim which isn't true. In those cases, the stakes are usually higher, and the burden of proof is entirely on them. I was asking about examples of those kinds of failings.