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1. Yes but think of all the attackers who aren't skilled enough to do that. Making the barrier to entry higher is exactly what you want. 2. Well yeah! If I wri
by Spivak 7y ago
1. Yes but think of all the attackers who aren't skilled enough to do that. Making the barrier to entry higher is exactly what you want.
2. Well yeah! If I write vulnerable code I would want to make sure it was as difficult as possible to discover. Who wants easy to discover vulnerabilities? Anyone who I want looking at my code will have the source and can build without obfuscation and fuzzing protection.
2.1 If I'm a big enough target sure, but if I make it as annoying and difficult to work with my software as possible the hope is that you'll go somewhere else.
3. The performance impact is super mild and completely unnoticeable on anything that works in human time. The slight performance hit to protect your IP is a no brainier calculation. Nvidia famously implores absolutely crazy obfuscation on their chips and they're still the market leader on speed.
4. Companies that use these kinds of techniques don't recognize a difference between the two. If you're not employed or contracted by them and you're looking at their code you are the adversary.
I think it's funny that when we talk about encryption we talk about its strength like "an attacker with a supercomputer X years to brute-force it" but when it comes to things like this we say "security through obscurity! Worthless!" instead of "the total population of people with the skills to even begin to find vulnerabilities is professional security researches and could all fit comfortably in a mid-sized event venue."
- desc 7y ago> but if I make it as annoying and difficult to work with my software as possible the hope is that you'll go somewhere else. And yet, Oracle still has some market share.
- saagarjha 7y agoEncryption has mathematical guarantees on its resistance against brute-forcing. Security by obscurity just makes it harder for white hats to help you and lets nation states and other determined attackers exploit you secretly.
- 283b 7y agoIf by brute force you mean checking the entire key space, fuzzing can be made to sound quite similar to encryption. There is a specific program path, or "key", that leads to a crash. Fuzzers attempt to search all paths in a somewhat intelligent manner to find the "key" path that leads to a crash. We can inhibit the fuzzers ability to find the key by increasing the search space by adding more paths. The way in which this paper adds paths takes advantages of the way intelligent fuzzers explore the path space to make it even more difficult to search the entire path space.
- feanaro 7y agoThe problem is that there isn't a single key in this case, there are many. If there was just a single key to begin with, fuzzing would not be very fruitful for any moderately+ complex program since finding that single path would already be very hard (and therefore has a high cost/benefit). What fuzzification actually enables is to hide more keys (crashes) from a constant amount of (current) effort. Those crashes are still there and now there are more of them, waiting for someone to find them with an alternative method or simply by buying more fuzzing equipment to scale horizontally.
- SCHiM 7y ago2./2.1./4. Yes this is true, and that's exactly where root of my problem with this direction of research lies. The incentives of software vendors are partially misaligned with those of the users. A vendor will want to maximize their profit, if a tool that implements this research allows them to be lazy then en-masse they will (ab)use it. 3. Software is layered, if every layer of your electron app starts using this type of obfuscation you will notice the slowdown. 1. I think there's an underlying assumption we both make about this research: it will increase the costs of finding exploits, but it will definitively not prevent a skilled attacker. I also don't think it absolutely disqualifies anyone who's already able to craft an exploit, perhaps it will take them longer but anyone with the reversing chops to abuse an aslr weakness can figure out how to patch out or reverse the jumptables. With that in mind, it comes back at the question: Is it worth it? Increase the costs for an attacker but simultaneously adding an incentive for vendors to be lazy, an chose a cheap band-aid bolted-on-security approach as opposed to what we all know is the eventual (expensive) fix for memory related security problems? I still think: hell no, don't make this stuff available, invest resources in alternative mitigations if not in outright solving the issue.