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~ Nobody goes there anymore. It’s too crowded. There remains something bizarre about how the language of international trade is couched. I still don't see down
by roenxi 7y ago
~ Nobody goes there anymore. It’s too crowded.
There remains something bizarre about how the language of international trade is couched. I still don't see downsides from having a strong currency that are so bad it needs such a response.
The basic problem is you want Swiss Watchmaker to be able to swap watches for, say, Italian tomatoes. Devaluing the Swiss currency doesn't cause him to be able to buy any more tomatoes; it just forces him to sell more watches. If he was happy to swap watches for tomatoes at that rate, he already had the power to sell his watches more cheaply.
Honestly, I don't like transfer payments but they are better than trying to hold down a currency with financial shenanigans. If the market says it will give you 10,000 tomatoes for 9,000 watches, the gain of forcing the equilibrium to 10,000 tomatoes and 10,000 watches is highly questionable. And any individual watchmakers could already force the equilibrium in that direction if they wanted to without any help.
- bobthepanda 7y agoHe may not be able to sell his watches as well with a strong currency. For one thing, if his inputs are mostly Swiss (suppliers and labor) then they too have gone up in price, so he can’t slash prices in response. And if the Swiss watches get too expensive people may start looking to buy some Japanese watches instead because they’re relatively cheaper.
- roenxi 7y ago> For one thing, if his inputs are mostly Swiss (suppliers and labor) then they too have gone up in price, so he can’t slash prices in response. But this implies he's taking resources which could be productively used in Switzerland and redirecting them to foreigners. No individual would be worse off, and the net would be better, if the market was left alone except for some transfer payments within Switzerland. Option A) Sell A watches for B tomatoes, some transfer payments to even out who gets the tomatoes. C watches worth of resources remain with the Swiss. Option B) Sell A + C watches for B tomatoes, no transfer payments because the tomatoes are distributed as A. Neither of these solutions are the capitalist one (which is A but no redistribution). However, if the government is going to pick one, A looks better. Possibly dropping prices would result in more resources entering, but if the watchmakers didn't think dropping their prices initially was a good idea then this aspect is almost surely going to lead to worse use of the resources than leaving them in Switzerland. It is too complicated to reason about the effect that would have; but it certainly isn't at all obvious that it would be a good thing vs the benefits of a strong currency and consuming resources internally. > And if the Swiss watches get too expensive people may start looking to buy some Japanese watches instead because they’re relatively cheaper. I don't see this as countering my original compliant; the Swiss government doesn't need to force watchmakers to drop prices - they can do that on their own. My point here is that this is ultimately a redistributive policy. Roughly the same amount of resources are coming in to Switzerland, but instead of going to a small group of watchmakers they are going to a larger group of watchmakers. Ok. No worries. But why is a key part of the plan subsidising Italian consumption? By government mandate? Through a very-difficult-to-measure-the-exact-effects process of negative interest rates and worrying about currency strength? Could they not just institute a struggling watchmaker payment funded by a gentle tax on capital inflows without the strange dance? It would be much easier to measure the effects of a gentle tax than mucking around with interest rates. This is a solution that works because nobody knows if they are the one paying for it. But it is going to cost more than a plain tax-and-spend scheme, because it has many opportunities for strange market-bending side effects.