3 ms·
Very interesting seeing how this attack is performed. I'd imagine that future keyfobs would use a time of flight based system of call and response to prevent th
by pontifier 7y ago
Very interesting seeing how this attack is performed. I'd imagine that future keyfobs would use a time of flight based system of call and response to prevent this sort of thing.
- sdflhasjd 7y agoSomething like a gyro/accelerometer could ensure the keyfob is on a person, and not just sitting on a table.
- pontifier 7y agoNot a perfect solution. Keys are sometimes set down in the vehicle before starting. A time based rule (motion within last x) won't help because sitting in a non-running car is something that happens often enough that keys not working would be a problem. Also, someone could steal your car while you have your keys in your pocket inside your house, or walking around a store.
- SAI_Peregrinus 7y agoOr just a cryptographic challenge/response. No range limitations like time-of-flight, protects against replay, cheap with appropriate hardware. And since key fobs are custom hardware anyway (and typically expensive!) the <1$ crypto ICs I've used like the Microchip ATECC608 could be added to implement it with minimal price increase.
- purple_ducks 7y ago> Or just a cryptographic challenge/response This was a relay attack. Not a re_p_lay attack. It's just amplifying the signal from the outside car to the inside keys & vice versa.