I'm a bit surprised by many of the arguments posted here trying to problematize paper votes. This is how it is done in Sweden - I don't want to imply that it's

I'm a bit surprised by many of the arguments posted here trying to problematize paper votes. This is how it is done in Sweden - I don't want to imply that it's without issues, but it should illustrate how all of the "issues" with paper ballots are resolvable. * Prior to election, all registered voters get a personal "voting card" sent to their home address. The letter also tells you which polling station you have been assigned. * On election day, each voter goes to the polling station they have been assigned. You need your ID but not necessarily your voting card. * Staff verify your ID and you go behind a blind where you put paper ballots (with the option to vote for a party, and, optionally, for a candidate in that party) in sealed envelopes, one for each level you are voting on. * You go back to the staff with your sealed envelopes, staff mark you as having voted and put the envelopes in boxes. * At the closing of election day, doors are closed, boxes are opened and ballots are counted at the location with multiple people overseeing each step in the process. The results of this counting is announced the day after as a preliminary result. * Ballots then get put in tamper-proof bags and transported (again, with oversight) to a hub per district where counting is done again. Final results are announced about 10 days after election. * Voters who can't vote on their assigned location on election day can vote in advance at any location. The process works the same, except the sealed envelopes are put in another envelope, together with the voter card mentioned above. These ballots are saved for election day, when they are counted together with the normal votes. * There are also mechanisms for voting via mail (arguably less secure) or at embassies in foreign countries. The process is similar as for advance votes. * The public is invited to be physically present to monitor the counting of votes. There's zero machinery involved. The votes are anonymous, yet double-voting is prevented. Counting is done more than once by default. I understand from here that the U.S. is exceptional in that you can't expect registered voters to have a strong ID. I am sure some kind of strong voter IDs could be issued (for free, obviously) that can accommodate for that. I can not imagine that doing manual recounting of votes and ensuring integrity with manual labor is significantly more costly than the contracts with voting machine suppliers. If it is, it's worth it. In my opinion, provably fair, free and anonymous voting is the killer app for blockchain. It is still a theoretically unsolved problem, however, and until we get there (if we ever do), machine-less paper voting is strictly better than both electronic voting and electronic counting of votes. If anything, the manual counting can be supplemented by electronic counting machines. You think the U.S. is unique and this won't work because of federalization? We still somehow manage to pull off voting for European Parliament. More info for the curious here: https://www.val.se/servicelankar/other-languages/english-engelska/voting-cards.html https://www.val.se/servicelankar/other-languages/english-eng...