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Assuming you're using proper paper chain of custody, seals, etc on your paper ballots, then how do you propose that ballots would be "destroyed, lost, or conven

by beat 7y ago

Assuming you're using proper paper chain of custody, seals, etc on your paper ballots, then how do you propose that ballots would be "destroyed, lost, or conveniently found"? These things are all extremely easy to audit. Humans have been doing paper document chains of custody since the ancient Chinese and the Romans. It's not rocket surgery.

wuliwong 7y ago
>Humans have been doing paper document chains of custody since the ancient Chinese and the Romans. It's not rocket surgery. And people have been figuring out ways to get around these impediments since their advent. It's not as if voter fraud started with computers. I'm not saying that computer voting is superior but I think you are overstating the security of paper voting systems.
- beat 7y ago
  Ok, so here are my assumptions for a good chain of custody... Ballots, whether sealed or unsealed, blank or marked, must have at least two people present (from different parties) for all handling. At the end of the process, it should be possible to account for every ballot, marked or blank, and know who handled it (except for the individual voter), from the moment it was received from the printer to the moment it is eventually destroyed. Counts should match at every level, from the printer to the distribution to the voters to the number of ballots in each locked box. Every box can also be traced to an individual machine. Assuming this is done, where do you fit fraud in? I see three paths for fraud - adding ballots, removing ballots, and substituting/altering ballots. How do you add or remove ballots without upsetting the counts? How do you substitute/alter ballots without breaking seals? And mind you, the techniques have to be able to a: survive a recount, and b: work at a sufficient scale to meaningfully alter the election results. The way to break this isn't the weakness of paper security. It's to undermine the chain of custody itself, do have the kinds of sloppy processes endemic to Florida, Ohio, etc.

by beat 7y ago

wuliwong 7y ago

>Humans have been doing paper document chains of custody since the ancient Chinese and the Romans. It's not rocket surgery. And people have been figuring out ways to get around these impediments since their advent. It's not as if voter fraud started with computers. I'm not saying that computer voting is superior but I think you are overstating the security of paper voting systems.

beat 7y ago
Ok, so here are my assumptions for a good chain of custody... Ballots, whether sealed or unsealed, blank or marked, must have at least two people present (from different parties) for all handling. At the end of the process, it should be possible to account for every ballot, marked or blank, and know who handled it (except for the individual voter), from the moment it was received from the printer to the moment it is eventually destroyed. Counts should match at every level, from the printer to the distribution to the voters to the number of ballots in each locked box. Every box can also be traced to an individual machine. Assuming this is done, where do you fit fraud in? I see three paths for fraud - adding ballots, removing ballots, and substituting/altering ballots. How do you add or remove ballots without upsetting the counts? How do you substitute/alter ballots without breaking seals? And mind you, the techniques have to be able to a: survive a recount, and b: work at a sufficient scale to meaningfully alter the election results. The way to break this isn't the weakness of paper security. It's to undermine the chain of custody itself, do have the kinds of sloppy processes endemic to Florida, Ohio, etc.