3 ms·
> But you'd need mandatory random audits, and a legal requirement to keep the paper originals for up to years Or you publish all the marked ballots, so that an
by tzs 7y ago
> But you'd need mandatory random audits, and a legal requirement to keep the paper originals for up to years
Or you publish all the marked ballots, so that anyone who wanted to could do their own count to verify the results.
You can also design this so that any individual voter can check to see that their ballot was included in the count, and counted correctly, without being able to prove to someone else that they voted for a particular candidate (so that vote buying schemes aren't enforceable).
See Scantegrity [1] for a specific system with these properties, which can be implemented on top of existing optical scan vote counting machines. For a more general look at securing voting, see end-to-end auditable voting systems [2].
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scantegrity https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scantegrity
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_systems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_sy...