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In the philosophical sense, I'd say truth is what reality is. In the practical sense, truth is what the evidence indicates, and anything else either remains unk
by chousuke 7y ago
In the philosophical sense, I'd say truth is what reality is. In the practical sense, truth is what the evidence indicates, and anything else either remains unknown or is false if it contradicts the evidence.
We're limited to never knowing the complete truth of most things, which is why we have science so we can make our practical truth approximation ever closer to reality.
- ta1234567890 7y agoThat is a circular definition of truth. Which very well exemplifies the limitation of our spoken/written languages and the ineffability of reality. Any evidence needs to be interpreted. You need to assign some sort of meaning to evidence. That interpretation is subjective. And this has happened a million times in science. If science actually discovered "truth", then it would never need to be revised. Nevertheless science is constantly discovering that it was wrong and keeps updating itself (well, us humans keep doing that). Science (like religion), is just a system for humans to assign meaning to their experiences. Meanings will differ, just like our individual experiences. Hence these systems are built on collective agreement and continuous re-building of their own meanings. Also, if as you say, we're limited to never knowing the complete truth of most things, then how could we possibly ever know that science is actually getting us closer to that truth?
- pupe 7y agoI have no idea why this is getting downvoted so much. This is a great, well articulated comment that raises significant points by situating science as a human activity, and thereby subject to situated experienced. The often-overlooked fields of Science and Technology Studies and Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, which have been around for decades (and which, contrary to what many believe, treat Latour as an initiator of further discussion that has spun into much more robust work, rather than as a decisive figure). I wholeheartedly recommend any interested readers to look into it, particularly Andrew Pickering’s 1992 edited volume Science as Cultural Practice as an introductory jumping off point. My second recommendation is always Karin Knorr-Cetina’s 2001 book titled Epistemic Cultures (anything else by her is also superb!).