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There doesn't have to be a clear boundary to say that, for example, there's a difference between unfounded assumptions and beleifs that have been tested to diff

There doesn't have to be a clear boundary to say that, for example, there's a difference between unfounded assumptions and beleifs that have been tested to different degrees of rigour. What basis is there for the belief that abstract reasoning ought to involve more sophisticated processing? I think it's just an assumption with no solid basis (my initial comment gives the reason I believe that assumption exists). Yes, the stars thing may have felt paradoxical but it isn't itself a paradox. The thing is that if all it takes for something to be considered to be a paradox is for it to feel paradoxical to a sufficient number of people the a lot of well-established bits of scientific knowledge -- that are in no way paradoxes to people who have the relevant undergraduate degrees -- are paradoxes because they feel that way to the population at large.

Sharlin 7y ago
Well, outside of math, "paradox" is not a fundamental ontological category. What is a paradox now may not be so in a hundred years, and hindsight is always 20:20. Paradoxes of this type are definitely paradoxes if they contradict something that appears to be common sense and a consensus position of some sort, irrespective of the level of rigor. The Monty Hall problem confuses even career statisticians, but that's not because the common but wrong answer is somehow based on sound statistical knowledge; it's simply because answer seems so intuitive and self-evident that we don't bother to "shut up and calculate". It seems to me that to count as a paradox, a result has to be both contradictory—not just different—from what is expected; and, the result has to be especially surprising; in Bayesian terms, the expected outcome must have had a high prior probability.
- jamesrcole 7y ago
  I'm saying, for reasons given in my initial comment, that it does not appear in any way contradictory or surprising to people like me who don't hold certain assumptions. Of course other people may find it paradoxical. We're in agreement that it's not a fundamental ontological category, i.e. that it's part of a map not the territory. And it's possible to argue about whether a particular map is flawed or not, such as it being flawed because it contains certain flawed assumptions. If we can show that a map in which it seems paradoxical is flawed, and show that a different map, in which it doesn't seem paradoxical, is more accurate, then this can be grounds for arguing that the phenomenon is no deserving of being called paradoxical.

Sharlin 7y ago

Well, outside of math, "paradox" is not a fundamental ontological category. What is a paradox now may not be so in a hundred years, and hindsight is always 20:20. Paradoxes of this type are definitely paradoxes if they contradict something that appears to be common sense and a consensus position of some sort, irrespective of the level of rigor. The Monty Hall problem confuses even career statisticians, but that's not because the common but wrong answer is somehow based on sound statistical knowledge; it's simply because answer seems so intuitive and self-evident that we don't bother to "shut up and calculate". It seems to me that to count as a paradox, a result has to be both contradictory—not just different—from what is expected; and, the result has to be especially surprising; in Bayesian terms, the expected outcome must have had a high prior probability.

jamesrcole 7y ago
I'm saying, for reasons given in my initial comment, that it does not appear in any way contradictory or surprising to people like me who don't hold certain assumptions. Of course other people may find it paradoxical. We're in agreement that it's not a fundamental ontological category, i.e. that it's part of a map not the territory. And it's possible to argue about whether a particular map is flawed or not, such as it being flawed because it contains certain flawed assumptions. If we can show that a map in which it seems paradoxical is flawed, and show that a different map, in which it doesn't seem paradoxical, is more accurate, then this can be grounds for arguing that the phenomenon is no deserving of being called paradoxical.