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As someone with a direct interest in this (I run https://certsimple.com https://certsimple.com, a startup that focuses on steamlining the EV verification proces
by nailer 7y ago
As someone with a direct interest in this (I run https://certsimple.com https://certsimple.com, a startup that focuses on steamlining the EV verification process), this is predictable but still hilarious:
> Through our own research as well as a survey of prior academic work, the Chrome Security UX team has determined that the EV UI does not protect users as intended (see Further Reading in the Chromium document). Users do not appear to make secure choices (such as not entering password or credit card information) when the UI is altered or removed, as would be necessary for EV UI to provide meaningful protection.
Chrome has never tested a verification marker that resembles ANY of the common standards for verification used on Twitter, Whatsapp, Facebook, Apple's App Store or Google Play.
No research into better indicators has been done because Google do not wish to do research into better indicators. Decisions are:
- made by one individual who believes users should be able to detect bad sites because they "don't look right"
- supported by another person who thinks users can use DNS to decider whether sites are real. Ask a regular web user, or even an infosec expert to determine which out of "google.im", "google.co.uk" and "withgoogle.com" is actually controlled by Google.
- and further supported by somebody else who thinks a study of IE7's UI:
foo.com VeriSign [US]
is relevant research (see this article).
Yes UX designed in the mid-2000s, prior to modern
verification standards, is sub optimal.
I've suggested Google's UX people investigate better alternatives for years. They're not interested.
The CAs aren't that much better either (being slow to realise how much the market is changing around them) but Google are absolutely not interested in finding out what would be possible with a modern verification UI, or making sure users know who they're connected to.
- Scott_Helme_ 7y agoAs the organisations that stand to benefit financially from selling these indicators, perhaps it's CAs that should invest in the research? CAs seem to constantly point at the browsers as the party responsible for doing that research, but I don't see why.
- nailer 7y agoTotally agreed CAs dropped the ball on research too. It's not an either/or thing: browsers makers need to ensure their security UX helps people understand what they're connecting to and CAs need to do the same and additionally ensure their verification processes are robust.
- Scott_Helme_ 7y agoBut, didn't browser vendors do that and that's why the EV indicator is being moved to a less prominent location?..
- nailer 7y agoNo, browser vendors have not tested verification markers that are consistent with other platforms. See the top post in this thread.
- Scott_Helme_ 7y agoThat's not what I asked, that's a straw man. Browser vendors have tested the efficacy of the current EV indicator, resulting in the current action. If you feel that testing an alternative indicator consistent with other platforms is a good idea, then perhaps that's where the CAs should start their research.
- nailer 7y ago>>>> browsers makers need to ensure their security UX helps people understand what they're connecting to >>> But, didn't browser vendors do that >> No, browser vendors have not tested verification markers that are consistent with other platforms. > That's not what I asked, that's a straw man. Doesn't seem like much of a straw man to me. Investigating whether browser security UX helps people understand what they're connecting to logically includes looking at designs other than the current one. > then perhaps that's where the CAs should start their research. Yes. And browsers too.