Is it accurate to interpret from the article that if an angel investor is in fact backed by money from LPs, her fiduciary responsibility to her own investors is

Is it accurate to interpret from the article that if an angel investor is in fact backed by money from LPs, her fiduciary responsibility to her own investors is greater than the flexibility she might have toward the company if she were just running her own money, and therefore these incentives can put her interests at odds with founders? Further, is there an implication that it's the SAFE itself that sets this up in the first place? The example I'm thinking of is an institutional LP who can't do risky deals like startup SAFEs, but they can buy into "established," funds where the risk is distributed over other partners who can, and this angel front gets them the startup portfolio exposure they need. The downside is the SAFE explodes into giving up more equity than founders anticipated to their proxied angel, whose partners' risk appetite causes complexity and conflicts with potential A-round participants. I've only read about this stuff, but what would you correct about these interpretations?