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it's pretty easy to detect only when you are being piped and then only include malicious code then

by MiroF 7y ago

acdha 7y ago
Do you believe GitHub has that infrastructure deployed? If not, this is a blind alley to worry about. If so, what other precautions have you taken to avoid compromised tarballs, unauthorized pushes to repos with auto-deployment pipelines, etc.? The point is that in reality you’re orders of magnitude more likely to be compromised by ads in your browser, an undetected flaw in legitimate code, or a compromised maintainer than GitHub having deployed custom infrastructure to target you. If you’re being target by a government, why would they do this instead of using the same TLS exploit to serve you a dodgy Chrome or OS update which is harder to detect and will work against 100% of targets?
- tekknik 7y ago
  So because ads can compromise us we should ignore the security of package managers? How about this for a reason, where are the checksums when I’m curling and piping? How do I validate in an automated fashion the validity of this file I’m piping into an interpreter? When installing a package it’s quite easy to have redundant copies of an index with checksums pointing to a repository hosting the actual code. The attack surface is much smaller vs a curl | python This is bad practice, stop promoting it or downplaying it’s security issues. Edit: smaller instead of larger
  - acdha 7y ago
    HTTPS has checksums, and note that we’re specifically talking about installing from Github, where every change is tracked. > This is bad practice, stop promoting it or downplaying it’s security issues. I’m trying to get you to do some security analysis focused on threats which are possible in this model but not the real alternatives (download and install, install from a registry like PyPI or NPM, etc.). So far we have “GitHub could choose to destroy their business”, which seems like an acceptable risk and about the same as “NPM could destroy their business”.
    - tekknik 7y ago
      HTTPS doesn’t know if the file changed on the server so that doesn’t count here. I am doing security analysis. If this file changes and I’m using it in built server images then I have no way of automatically validating the changes are good without doing the checksumming myself and managing this data. What we have is a server that can be hacked and the files are unable to be verified by checksum
- MiroF 7y ago
  Fair point - I didn't actually click so I didn't see that it was a Github link, I was just reading the comments.

it's pretty easy to detect only when you are being piped and then only include malicious code then

by MiroF 7y ago

it's pretty easy to detect only when you are being piped and then only include malicious code then

Do you believe GitHub has that infrastructure deployed? If not, this is a blind alley to worry about. If so, what other precautions have you taken to avoid compromised tarballs, unauthorized pushes to repos with auto-deployment pipelines, etc.? The point is that in reality you’re orders of magnitude more likely to be compromised by ads in your browser, an undetected flaw in legitimate code, or a compromised maintainer than GitHub having deployed custom infrastructure to target you. If you’re being target by a government, why would they do this instead of using the same TLS exploit to serve you a dodgy Chrome or OS update which is harder to detect and will work against 100% of targets?

tekknik 7y ago
So because ads can compromise us we should ignore the security of package managers? How about this for a reason, where are the checksums when I’m curling and piping? How do I validate in an automated fashion the validity of this file I’m piping into an interpreter? When installing a package it’s quite easy to have redundant copies of an index with checksums pointing to a repository hosting the actual code. The attack surface is much smaller vs a curl | python This is bad practice, stop promoting it or downplaying it’s security issues. Edit: smaller instead of larger
- acdha 7y ago
  HTTPS has checksums, and note that we’re specifically talking about installing from Github, where every change is tracked. > This is bad practice, stop promoting it or downplaying it’s security issues. I’m trying to get you to do some security analysis focused on threats which are possible in this model but not the real alternatives (download and install, install from a registry like PyPI or NPM, etc.). So far we have “GitHub could choose to destroy their business”, which seems like an acceptable risk and about the same as “NPM could destroy their business”.
  - tekknik 7y ago
    HTTPS doesn’t know if the file changed on the server so that doesn’t count here. I am doing security analysis. If this file changes and I’m using it in built server images then I have no way of automatically validating the changes are good without doing the checksumming myself and managing this data. What we have is a server that can be hacked and the files are unable to be verified by checksum
MiroF 7y ago
Fair point - I didn't actually click so I didn't see that it was a Github link, I was just reading the comments.