> FUD. Why should we want "behaves exactly as the browser does", when browsers (in fact, mostly Google's) are in fact turning against their users? Issue of sco

> FUD. Why should we want "behaves exactly as the browser does", when browsers (in fact, mostly Google's) are in fact turning against their users? Issue of scope. Chrome isn't selectively insecure. >AFAIK there is no general protocol insecurity with TLS <= 1.2, unlike SSL3. There's also no reason for MITM proxies to not start using 1.3 too once it becomes more common, which I'm pretty sure will happen. Browsers are very particular about how they communicate certificate validation failures. This is generally obscured by the MITM proxy, as is the certificate itself. Making MITM easy will inevitably lead to people running badly made proxies, especially if such a proxy is installed to the system as adware, the same reason both Chrome and Firefox wouldn't allow random unsigned extensions. I'd honestly be surprised if any of them do HSTS properly. >IMHO the whole "security" thing has turned into a power-grab for companies to enforce their control over users, which is the most disturbing part. We want security, but also control, which is not the "security" they want. You can run dev builds - usually even the official ones - to turn most of those security features off. They're intended for your average non-power user. >Edit: yay, instant downvotes! I hope you enjoy being herded by Google, because that's where the future is heading if we don't oppose. That's what you get for making an argument about browser vendors about Google and conflating it with Chrome issues in a different scope.