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There are many problems with using a MITM proxy, however. The primary problem is that it’s very very hard to ensure that it behaves exactly as the browser does
by userbinator 7y ago
There are many problems with using a MITM proxy, however. The primary problem is that it’s very very hard to ensure that it behaves exactly as the browser does and that it does not introduce security vulnerabilities.
FUD. Why should we want "behaves exactly as the browser does", when browsers (in fact, mostly Google's) are in fact turning against their users?
While browser vendors are wary of any sort of interception of HTTPS traffic
Especially Google's, because that's one of the ways you can still block ads and modify pages to have them displayed as the user(-agent) wants, while it continues to slowly remove abilities from browser extensions.
Similarly, the MITM might not support the most secure versions of protocols supported by the browser and the server (e.g. TLS/1.3)
AFAIK there is no general protocol insecurity with TLS <= 1.2, unlike SSL3. There's also no reason for MITM proxies to not start using 1.3 too once it becomes more common, which I'm pretty sure will happen.
this approach is generally preferable to MITM proxies.
...because it provides no way to modify the content, i.e. being able to do things like block ads, inject stylesheets, and generally behave as the user wants.
IMHO the whole "security" thing has turned into a power-grab for companies to enforce their control over users, which is the most disturbing part. We want security, but also control, which is not the "security" they want.
(This comment was posted from a browser that does not support even SSL 2.0, but is using TLS 1.2 via a proxy... and I know that 1.3 will be coming sometime in the future. When that happens, everything that goes through it can also start using 1.3.)
Edit: yay, instant downvotes! I hope you enjoy being herded by Google, because that's where the future is heading if we don't oppose.
- jakub_g 7y agoI assume you've never heard of ISPs or vendors that _inject_ ads and other shenanigans on non-https and decrypted https websites?
- userbinator 7y agoThat's the ISP's problem. Mine doesn't do that. I trust it more than Google, at any rate.
- sascha_sl 7y agoBeing able to choose your ISP is a luxury many people, especially in the US, do not have. Elsewhere there might be choice, but none are really trustworthy. This is about disincentivising ISPs. If it's hard for them to pull off, they wouldn't do it and it would become something normal every ISP does.
- zzzcpan 7y ago> Being able to choose your ISP is a luxury many people, especially in the US, do not have. Elsewhere there might be choice, but none are really trustworthy. If you don't trust your ISP you really should use a VPN. You still have to trust your ISP if you don't and nothing that megacorps do can help you there.
- sascha_sl 7y agoTLS mitigates 90% of the things a VPN promises to do for you rather well. But you can get that up to 95 running a local DNS resolver with tls upstream.
- kbenson 7y agoIsn't that one of the reasons for DNS over HTTPS, which is being rolled out now[1] in some browsers? You can keep your ISP from seeing/intercepting/replacing DNS requests. 1: https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/firefox-dns-over-https https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/firefox-dns-over-https
- zzzcpan 7y agoThere is no 90% or 95% neither with TLS nor with DoH. There are still IP addresses, OS-specific data in IP packets, response sizes, traffic patterns, SNI, active probing data, etc. ISPs can get so much stuff on you, you really should use a VPN if you don't trust your ISP.
- 7y ago
- sascha_sl 7y ago> FUD. Why should we want "behaves exactly as the browser does", when browsers (in fact, mostly Google's) are in fact turning against their users? Issue of scope. Chrome isn't selectively insecure. >AFAIK there is no general protocol insecurity with TLS <= 1.2, unlike SSL3. There's also no reason for MITM proxies to not start using 1.3 too once it becomes more common, which I'm pretty sure will happen. Browsers are very particular about how they communicate certificate validation failures. This is generally obscured by the MITM proxy, as is the certificate itself. Making MITM easy will inevitably lead to people running badly made proxies, especially if such a proxy is installed to the system as adware, the same reason both Chrome and Firefox wouldn't allow random unsigned extensions. I'd honestly be surprised if any of them do HSTS properly. >IMHO the whole "security" thing has turned into a power-grab for companies to enforce their control over users, which is the most disturbing part. We want security, but also control, which is not the "security" they want. You can run dev builds - usually even the official ones - to turn most of those security features off. They're intended for your average non-power user. >Edit: yay, instant downvotes! I hope you enjoy being herded by Google, because that's where the future is heading if we don't oppose. That's what you get for making an argument about browser vendors about Google and conflating it with Chrome issues in a different scope.
- xg15 7y ago> I'd honestly be surprised if any of them do HSTS properly. Maybe I'm missing something, but what would an MITM proxy have to do here as long as it passes the HSTS headers on to the browser? As far as I understand, HSTS changes browser behavior in two places: - A browser will always connect to a domain via HTTPS, even if the URL says HTTP. - TLS errors become unskippable. Both behaviors are carried out by the browser and are not influenced by the specifics of the TLS connection itself (as long as a connection can be established). > You can run dev builds - usually even the official ones - to turn most of those security features off. They're intended for your average non-power user. But this is about average non-power users. Because the current trends force those users to place their complete trust in browser vendors or website operators, even if there were local administrators or third-party tools who could do a better job.
- dspillett 7y ago> AFAIK there is no general protocol insecurity with TLS <= 1.2, unlike SSL3 Yet. That we know of. > yay, instant downvotes! I hope you enjoy being herded by Google Yay! Complaining about downvotes! I hope you enjoy more downvotes.
- tialaramex 7y agoThere aren't _fatal and inherent_ flaws known in TLS 1.2. But there are flaws. For example Padding Oracles are not an inherent flaw in TLS 1.2, the protocol itself doesn't oblige you to tell attackers "You guessed wrong" until they guess right. But it becomes your responsibility to not let them know, an apparently optimal TLS implementation functions as a timing Oracle for CBC mode and can be exploited. Making CBC implementations sufficiently opaque that an adversary can't tell if they guessed the padding bytes correctly is really hard, OpenSSL have failed twice so far already. In TLS 1.3 this isn't an issue, it only has AEAD primitives. And lack of Forward Secrecy is a pretty serious problem for some applications. It's not fatal, but it's a problem. In TLS 1.3 you always get Forward Secrecy. In TLS 1.2 it was optional, so unless you're explicitly configuring the ciphersuites used there's no guarantee.
- vasilia 7y ago> FUD. Why should we want "behaves exactly as the browser does", when browsers (in fact, mostly Google's) are in fact turning against their users? https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1529830 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1529830 That's why. When you developing HTTP/load balancers it's a good way to test browser in the same environment.
- zzzcpan 7y agoYes, "security" push from corporations has been a joke for years already. I guess they see that people buy it, push it even farther and lock down everything they can under that excuse. But we can still survive it, Google is afraid of something and keeps a usable browser open source. And if things go south it won't be hard for a browser fork to implement a proper feature to allow interception of network requests before encryption and responses after decryption with another program, while disabling anti-features.
- xg15 7y agoAs long as there is still something where you can install that browser. Most interesting new hardware is itself increasingly locked down.
- Ajedi32 7y agoWhat kind of browser are you using that doesn't support any remotely recent version of TLS? IE6? That sounds like a major security risk, even ignoring what versions of TLS it does or doesn't support.
- userbinator 7y agoA text-based one. ;-)
- minitech 7y ago> FUD. Why should we want "behaves exactly as the browser does", when browsers (in fact, mostly Google's) are in fact turning against their users? To avoid introducing vulnerabilities, the way lots of antivirus MITMs do, for example. Like it says in the rest of your quote. > Especially Google's, because that's one of the ways you can still block ads and modify pages to have them displayed as the user(-agent) wants, while it continues to slowly remove abilities from browser extensions. Blocking ads by MITM? Yikes. Extensions are very much a better tool for that. The idea that browser vendors are going to slowly cripple them so that they’re no longer an effective blocking tool is… wrong. But anyone who was on Chrome can use Firefox anyway. > IMHO the whole "security" thing has turned into a power-grab for companies to enforce their control over users, which is the most disturbing part. We want security, but also control, which is not the "security" they want. FUD. > Edit: yay, instant downvotes! I hope you enjoy being herded by Google, because that's where the future is heading if we don't oppose. Don’t.
- userbinator 7y agoExtensions are very much a better tool for that. The idea that browser vendors are going to slowly cripple them so that they’re no longer an effective blocking tool is… wrong Did you not see this at all? https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20044430 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20044430 Don’t. You're certainly displaying your allegiance to Big G...
- sascha_sl 7y agoNow that's paranoid.
- zzma 7y ago> FUD. Why should we want "behaves exactly as the browser does", when browsers (in fact, mostly Google's) are in fact turning against their users? It turns out that most of the MITM products have questionable / insecure TLS stacks [1] and can introduce insecurity to user web traffic. [1] https://zanema.com/papers/ndss17_interception.pdf https://zanema.com/papers/ndss17_interception.pdf
- userbinator 7y agoThe solution is to tell those products' authors to improve them, as the paper you linked even recommends, and not throw the baby out with the bathwater. Unfortunately, doing the latter is more in line with the intentions of companies who want to be able to shove their content down your throat unimpeded, which is why you see so much astroturfing around this issue.