3 ms·
There is something to be said though, and that is that there is always something to be found somewhere. Lacking toolchains that can fully eliminate bugs, there
by jchw 7y ago
There is something to be said though, and that is that there is always something to be found somewhere. Lacking toolchains that can fully eliminate bugs, there will always be bugs. And even if there were legitimately no bugs, that doesn’t mean there won’t be bugs introduced in future releases, or bugs even outside the software itself.
The low hanging fruit has definitely been thoroughly picked these days, at least in software like iOS. But yet with pretty much near certainty, exploits find a way.
Perhaps even more fascinating, is that closing off one class of exploits always seems be followed by new kinds of exploits, like clockwork. You’d think eventually this would stop happening, but so far it hasn’t. CPU side channel attacks may not be completely new, but they’ve emerged as one of the new big targets as of late.
I really know little about security personally and obviously the amount of work that goes into serious security research should never be underestimated but I’m impressed at the inevitability of security bugs. Very few large programs escape a regular cycle of bugs. Maybe OpenBSD is the best example of Pretty Secure software.
- wahern 7y ago> The low hanging fruit has definitely been thoroughly picked these days The problem is that vendors aren't in the business of perfecting existing software. They're in the business of pushing out big, bold, feature-rich changes and additions. There's always new low hanging fruit.
- panic 7y agoThe vulnerabilities found in the article support your argument: SMS and MMS, which barely ever change or get new features, were much more secure than iMessage, which constantly gets new features and architectural changes.
- wahern 7y agoThere was a Microsoft Research paper several years ago which looked at the relationship of exploits to age of code in BSD kernels. The number of exploits in older code diminished over time, but that was often offset by the higher prevalence of exploits in newer code. That much is intuitive, but it's good that there's some well researched empirical evidence showing that that's the case. We can hypothesize that better languages and better mitigations (e.g. ASLR) can improve the situation across the board, and I don't doubt that that's the case, but I haven't yet seen the evidence. (Maybe I missed it?) It's probably too early as it's difficult to make apples-to-apples comparisons across those aspects.
- ianamartin 7y agoAre you totally and completely unaware that Apple actually does dedicate some annual cycles to bug fixes, performance improvements, and stability? And that they've done this many times in the last 20 years? Your generalization seems a bit broad.
- jamez1 7y agoSo what does the software look like up until those 'annual cycles'? It's pretty clear from the economic incentives of the companies producing the software, the sheer quantity of exploits found, and the surprisingly low amount of QA that would be needed to catch most bugs that the aforementioned view is correct.
- fulafel 7y agoThere are tiers of low-hanging. I think we're just seeing the end of the infosec stone age. It's still plain that OS vendors continue to make big compromises, by eg continuing to use C/C++ to handle untrusted data for decades after the risks became obvious, and we're constantly seeing C-caused vulnerabilities like Windows RDP server remote root, WhatsApp remote root, Broadcomm and Qualcomm Wlan RCEs, etc. The memory safety laissez faire attitude has also held back the state of the art in other fronts besides memory safety, because it's not so interesting to eliminate other classes of bugs while the elephant remains loose in the room.