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Again, you're missing the key here. Process. And current paper process includes audibility, security, and more. Done correctly, it is insanely difficult to s

Again, you're missing the key here. Process. And current paper process includes audibility, security, and more. Done correctly, it is insanely difficult to swap out an election box. Where would you do it? At the polling station, where members from ALL political parties are present? Volunteers are present too. All together watch the voting process, following through to opening the ballot box, and performing the initial count. https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=vot&dir=faq&document=faqelec&lang=e#a7 https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=vot&dir=faq&do... How, then, are election boxes to be secretly swapped? On top of this, all ballots are serialized. Each voting station has multiple voting boxes. Voting boxes are sealed. How are you going to compromise them? What I find astonishing, is how intensely some people seem to want to use computing for everything. Paper ballots, and the process used to employ them, are incredibly secure. Incredibly. Its a problem that absolutely, positively does not need to be solved. At all. Yet people are consistently working very diligently to do so, and the only real reason for that is one. Profit. And we don't need that motive in an election counting process.

darawk 7y ago
So, you believe that because a small group of people are kinda sorta overseeing this process over a long period of time, it is secure? Large groups of people watching intently are deceived extremely effectively and reliably by magicians all the time. I see no reason to think that the mere fact that some random citizens are "overseeing" the process makes it in any way secure. And any way, we don't have to theorize: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/upshot/mapped-why-voting-anomalies-are-impossible-to-ignore-in-north-carolina.html https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/upshot/mapped-why-voting-... The point is: a properly designed cryptographic voting system would make all of this provably secure. We wouldn't need to rely on witnesses paying attention, any citizen would be able to verify the integrity of the entire election on their home computer. That is why electronic voting is the best system.
- jakeogh 7y ago
  Nope. You never can audit most of it. Especially the hardware and firmware at vote time. And that's a false arg anyway, even if you could "audit" it (ask the hardware nicely to not lie to you:), it's still a (really) bad idea: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3_0x6oaDmI https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3_0x6oaDmI
  - darawk 7y ago
    > And that's a false arg anyway, even if you could "audit" it (ask the hardware nicely to not lie to you:) If individuals can audit their own votes, the hardware cannot lie.
    - jakeogh 7y ago
      You then have a trivially broken voting system.
      - darawk 7y ago
        I know why you think that is so. But I have already explained elsewhere in this thread why you're wrong. So why don't you look into it a little for yourself.
        jakeogh 7y ago
        Nothing you wrote negates the requirement of incoercibility. In all instances, the check can lie to you OR the vote system is broken. Electronic (aka proxy) voting is a requirement on the checklist to skip physical presense.

darawk 7y ago

So, you believe that because a small group of people are kinda sorta overseeing this process over a long period of time, it is secure? Large groups of people watching intently are deceived extremely effectively and reliably by magicians all the time. I see no reason to think that the mere fact that some random citizens are "overseeing" the process makes it in any way secure. And any way, we don't have to theorize: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/upshot/mapped-why-voting-anomalies-are-impossible-to-ignore-in-north-carolina.html https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/upshot/mapped-why-voting-... The point is: a properly designed cryptographic voting system would make all of this provably secure. We wouldn't need to rely on witnesses paying attention, any citizen would be able to verify the integrity of the entire election on their home computer. That is why electronic voting is the best system.

jakeogh 7y ago
Nope. You never can audit most of it. Especially the hardware and firmware at vote time. And that's a false arg anyway, even if you could "audit" it (ask the hardware nicely to not lie to you:), it's still a (really) bad idea: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3_0x6oaDmI https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3_0x6oaDmI
- darawk 7y ago
  > And that's a false arg anyway, even if you could "audit" it (ask the hardware nicely to not lie to you:) If individuals can audit their own votes, the hardware cannot lie.
  - jakeogh 7y ago
    You then have a trivially broken voting system.
    - darawk 7y ago
      I know why you think that is so. But I have already explained elsewhere in this thread why you're wrong. So why don't you look into it a little for yourself.
      - jakeogh 7y ago
        Nothing you wrote negates the requirement of incoercibility. In all instances, the check can lie to you OR the vote system is broken. Electronic (aka proxy) voting is a requirement on the checklist to skip physical presense.