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Uh, no. Computing is the absolute opposite of security. Doubly so for anything networked. If you want to take anything secure, and make it unsecure, simply t

Uh, no. Computing is the absolute opposite of security. Doubly so for anything networked. If you want to take anything secure, and make it unsecure, simply transform it from paper, and put it on a computer. Bam! Paper is millions of times more secure than a computer. No piece of software is ever, ever secure. There are always, literally always thousands and thousands of hardware, and software vulnerabilities just waiting to be exploited. Compared to any form of computerized voting, ballots are insanely secure. But what you're missing here is process. Paper voting has been around for a very, very long time. Process is well established, very simple to do, but it seems the US is always changing how to count, how to tally, and more. But, to pause and take a step back ... I'm not sure how you think adding a computer to the mix, improves auditing. The entire point of a voting system, is that your vote remains anonymous. Therefore, the device or method that records your vote? Must not ever ever be assigned to you. And this also includes any form of anonymization. This has also been handled for a very, very long time. Again, by process. I wonder, how many years have you (or others advocating a computer inserted into the voting process), studied in depth the chain of trust used with paper ballots? Or precisely how ballots are counted? Or, even months? Weeks? All I know is that when I researched paper ballots here in Canada, every aspect I could think of was covered. And that's what you'd expect, from a voting process that evolved over literally hundreds of years, with deep thought put into each voting cycle.

darawk 7y ago
> If you want to take anything secure, and make it unsecure, simply transform it from paper, and put it on a computer. Bam! In what way, exactly, do you think paper voting is 'secure'? Do you think pieces of paper cannot be forged? Do you think it's difficult to swap out election boxes or to alter ballots? > But, to pause and take a step back ... I'm not sure how you think adding a computer to the mix, improves auditing. The entire point of a voting system, is that your vote remains anonymous. Therefore, the device or method that records your vote? Must not ever ever be assigned to you. And this also includes any form of anonymization. Sure, if you think about it for only about 1 second, the system you might come up with sucks. However, people have thought about it for more than 1 second on occasion, and come up with some pretty good designs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_systems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_sy...
- bbarnett 7y ago
  Again, you're missing the key here. Process. And current paper process includes audibility, security, and more. Done correctly, it is insanely difficult to swap out an election box. Where would you do it? At the polling station, where members from ALL political parties are present? Volunteers are present too. All together watch the voting process, following through to opening the ballot box, and performing the initial count. https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=vot&dir=faq&document=faqelec&lang=e#a7 https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=vot&dir=faq&do... How, then, are election boxes to be secretly swapped? On top of this, all ballots are serialized. Each voting station has multiple voting boxes. Voting boxes are sealed. How are you going to compromise them? What I find astonishing, is how intensely some people seem to want to use computing for everything. Paper ballots, and the process used to employ them, are incredibly secure. Incredibly. Its a problem that absolutely, positively does not need to be solved. At all. Yet people are consistently working very diligently to do so, and the only real reason for that is one. Profit. And we don't need that motive in an election counting process.
  - darawk 7y ago
    So, you believe that because a small group of people are kinda sorta overseeing this process over a long period of time, it is secure? Large groups of people watching intently are deceived extremely effectively and reliably by magicians all the time. I see no reason to think that the mere fact that some random citizens are "overseeing" the process makes it in any way secure. And any way, we don't have to theorize: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/upshot/mapped-why-voting-anomalies-are-impossible-to-ignore-in-north-carolina.html https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/upshot/mapped-why-voting-... The point is: a properly designed cryptographic voting system would make all of this provably secure. We wouldn't need to rely on witnesses paying attention, any citizen would be able to verify the integrity of the entire election on their home computer. That is why electronic voting is the best system.
    - jakeogh 7y ago
      Nope. You never can audit most of it. Especially the hardware and firmware at vote time. And that's a false arg anyway, even if you could "audit" it (ask the hardware nicely to not lie to you:), it's still a (really) bad idea: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3_0x6oaDmI https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3_0x6oaDmI

darawk 7y ago

> If you want to take anything secure, and make it unsecure, simply transform it from paper, and put it on a computer. Bam! In what way, exactly, do you think paper voting is 'secure'? Do you think pieces of paper cannot be forged? Do you think it's difficult to swap out election boxes or to alter ballots? > But, to pause and take a step back ... I'm not sure how you think adding a computer to the mix, improves auditing. The entire point of a voting system, is that your vote remains anonymous. Therefore, the device or method that records your vote? Must not ever ever be assigned to you. And this also includes any form of anonymization. Sure, if you think about it for only about 1 second, the system you might come up with sucks. However, people have thought about it for more than 1 second on occasion, and come up with some pretty good designs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_systems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_sy...

bbarnett 7y ago
Again, you're missing the key here. Process. And current paper process includes audibility, security, and more. Done correctly, it is insanely difficult to swap out an election box. Where would you do it? At the polling station, where members from ALL political parties are present? Volunteers are present too. All together watch the voting process, following through to opening the ballot box, and performing the initial count. https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=vot&dir=faq&document=faqelec&lang=e#a7 https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=vot&dir=faq&do... How, then, are election boxes to be secretly swapped? On top of this, all ballots are serialized. Each voting station has multiple voting boxes. Voting boxes are sealed. How are you going to compromise them? What I find astonishing, is how intensely some people seem to want to use computing for everything. Paper ballots, and the process used to employ them, are incredibly secure. Incredibly. Its a problem that absolutely, positively does not need to be solved. At all. Yet people are consistently working very diligently to do so, and the only real reason for that is one. Profit. And we don't need that motive in an election counting process.
- darawk 7y ago
  So, you believe that because a small group of people are kinda sorta overseeing this process over a long period of time, it is secure? Large groups of people watching intently are deceived extremely effectively and reliably by magicians all the time. I see no reason to think that the mere fact that some random citizens are "overseeing" the process makes it in any way secure. And any way, we don't have to theorize: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/upshot/mapped-why-voting-anomalies-are-impossible-to-ignore-in-north-carolina.html https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/upshot/mapped-why-voting-... The point is: a properly designed cryptographic voting system would make all of this provably secure. We wouldn't need to rely on witnesses paying attention, any citizen would be able to verify the integrity of the entire election on their home computer. That is why electronic voting is the best system.
  - jakeogh 7y ago
    Nope. You never can audit most of it. Especially the hardware and firmware at vote time. And that's a false arg anyway, even if you could "audit" it (ask the hardware nicely to not lie to you:), it's still a (really) bad idea: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3_0x6oaDmI https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3_0x6oaDmI